THE New Republic

WHAT THE NEW RUSSIAN LINE MEANS

# The Soviet Union Since Stalin

George Kennan Merle Fainsod Tom Whitney Ilya Ehrenburg
Marshall Shulman Alexander Dallin Benjamin Schwartz
Daniel Schorr Lucian Pye Serge de Gunzburg Selig Harrison
Avrahm Yarmolinsky Klaus Knorr Arthur Barron Walter Laqueur
Hugh Massingham Zbigniew Brzezinski Nicolas Slonimsky

JUNE 11, 1956

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

# Washington Wire

## *Will isolationism revive?*

THE THING Russia is trying to do is isolate the United States. This is obvious from every move Moscow makes. The one great difference between international affairs today and in 1914 and 1939 is that the United States is at the head of a great Western alliance. Will it last? We take it for granted, but it is hardly more than a dozen years old; it runs counter to 150 years of tradition, and its continuance assumes a remarkable degree of self-control, intelligence and magnanimity within this country.

Every move by the Soviet is designed to end this alliance and isolate the United States. Moscow is playing the game far more skillfully than it did. Hardly an American newspaper but jeered at Moscow when its leaders made their repentant pilgrimage to Tito. We complacently hailed it as an American "victory." Well, the sequel is that Tito has gone to Moscow. Was it a victory? Moscow leaders have been to India, and most of the top leaders of Europe have been to Moscow. In Russia they are flattered and told that if it weren't for the US trade and peace would be advanced. The goal of isolating America is obvious.

And this same goal is what many Americans are trying to achieve. Those who are trying hardest are the right-wing Republicans in Mr. Eisenhower's own party. The idea of "Fortress America"—the very thing the Soviet seeks—is not dead in the US. It is the goal of the American go-it-alone school which treats India and all neutrals as enemies, lumps the world's Socialists with Communists, fights all tariff cuts, rejects exchange of nuclear knowledge, uses foreign aid as a club to try to blackmail free allies, ridicules economic aid to have-not countries.

In Wisconsin, the GOP isolationists rejected Sen. Alexander Wiley and approved instead pro-McCarthyite Rep. Glenn Davis as their Senatorial candidate. They lampooned the USA as "Uncle Sap" for aiding foreigners. Wiley had risked his political life to support Eisenhower policies, but the President was silent. The President likes to get on with people—remember he deleted from a speech praise of George Marshall to placate McCarthy in 1952.

Isolationism isn't all on the GOP side: internationalist Sen. Walter George (D, Ga.) saw the drift and quietly bowed out to Talmadge—a Democrat of the Glenn Davis "Uncle Sap" school.

## *Solace from the White House*

NOBODY CAN say Eisenhower's heart isn't in the right place; it's his leadership that is questioned. He is trying to remake the GOP in his own image. But if 1952 and 1954 are any criteria, Ike in 1956 will be more intent on electing Republicans—any Republicans—than in re-making the party. A fortnight ago in his Waco speech Ike called Communism "a gigantic failure." This reassurance was wonderfully comforting to isolationists. It soothed the whole nation. Last week he told a GOP rally here that US prestige "has never been so high" since World War II and that "we have largely nullified its [Russia's] reliance upon force." This was another pleasant sedative. It is true that it did not aid the Administration's desperately endangered foreign-aid bill in Congress. But he followed up this sleeping pill by warning against "complacency," The complacency referred to was GOP complacency about victory in the fall election.

This column loves Ike. It is not militaristic by nature. Yet we confess that America's relative decline in defense *vis-à-vis* Russia gives us the creeps. Has a dominant power ever before in history yielded military supremacy to a deadly rival in exchange for equality—or inferiority? America now seems to be doing this both as to guided missiles and jet planes. Gen. Curtis LeMay, Strategic Aid Commander, told Congress the other day that by 1959 the Russians will have twice as many long-range bombers as we have. Of course, we are saving money by slowing down and getting a fine budget surplus. With Eisenhower in Washington it seems almost sacrilegious to criticize.

The Eisenhower leadership is a subtle thing. Brisker action would diminish his enormous popularity. Think of the commotion if, instead of generalized Inspirationals, Ike had taken specific moral leadership against McCarthy; or in behalf of Wiley now. There is no question that his heart is in the right place. But Eisenhower hates to intervene.

## *Failure of leadership*

FOR INSTANCE, there is the crucial question of East-West trade and contracts hanging fire. Dana Schmidt of the *New York Times* and Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post and Times Herald* in separate articles explain that Ike "generally favors East-West exchange." But they add that Under-Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. is opposed to it.

"President Eisenhower could, of course," Schmidt explains, "make the decision himself . . . [but] he is leaving it to the slow mills of the Administration's interdepartmental committees." Or, as Roberts puts it, "he consistently has told his subordinates to work out a program and come back to him when it is agreed upon."

The result is that we don't have any policy. Walter Lippmann last week, speaking of the broader American approach to declining NATO, put it more harshly than this mild column would ever think of doing—he called it simply "failure of leadership."

## *Notes*

PROTECTIONISTS will start screaming this week over proposed mutual tariff concessions made by the US and 24 nations at Geneva under the auspices of the international Organization for Trade Co-operation (OTC); a bill for full US participation in OTC won't pass the House without all-out Eisenhower hammering. . . . Books that have interested us: *The Power Elite* by C. Wright Mills (the modern Veblen), and *The American Presidency* by Clinton Rossiter (who suavely ranks FDR and Truman above Ike). . . . The choice of Fred Seaton instead of Under-Secretary Clarence Davis as the new Secretary of Interior is a deft Administration stroke; it quietly cuts the Administration away from the McKay-Davis "give-away" program—as smooth a move as the departure of La Hobby after the Salk vaccine debacle.

**T.R.B.**

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A JOURNAL OF OPINION

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# US Diplomacy

AN ALARMING thing has happened. The Russians may no longer be their own worst enemy. For more than a decade, Stalin's intransigence was a deterrent to Soviet expansion. Soviet bad behavior helped to keep the anti-Communist coalition together and made life uncomfortable even for non-Communist neutralists who wanted only to be friends with everyone.

But if one fact emerges from the variety of comment in this issue of *The New Republic* on Russian policy since Stalin, it is that the task of the anti-Communist has been made more difficult. Familiar landmarks are disappearing. In Asia, the Middle East and even Europe, those who are not for us are not necessarily against us; and those who are not against us are not necessarily for us.

The response of Secretary Dulles is that Moscow's present conduct proves that the Soviets have "failed." If that is so, it should be observed that we in the US seem impoverished by our "success." For with the exception of a handful of men such as Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, John Sherman Cooper and Sen. Mike Mansfield, the leaders in both political parties show no enthusiasm for exploring new avenues for US diplomacy.

It is frequently said that we cannot expect any bold new approach to foreign affairs during an election year, that the voters want sedatives, not stimulants. And yet, is domestic politics entirely to blame for our national complacency? Are the people failing to rise to the new challenges abroad, or is leadership failing to understand and to explain the nature of those challenges? 1948 was an election year also, but it was the year the Marshall Plan was launched.

Whether world revolution and domination remain the ultimate Russian goal or not, something has changed, and that something is not merely a decline in the fear of Soviet military aggression. It is a decline in the power of the white Atlantic community to keep the non-Communist world in line. The present Russian leadership is busily rectifying the tactical blunders of the arrogant Stalin. We in turn should perceive that the terms for co-operation between the US and others are not what they were. We are obliged to find new terms by which we can associate ourselves with many races, nations and economic systems to our mutual advantage.

The search for these terms will occupy us for a long while. At least it should. For the long-term danger to free institutions may be more profound, though more subtle, today than it was during the last years of Stalin's life. And that danger will not be overcome by holding fast to tactics invented to counteract the rigid diplomacy of the Stalinist era.

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## *Debate over Aid*

CONGRESS, it is now clear, will pass a foreign-aid bill which keeps intact the present overseas operation. For all its fury, the Congressional debate has been a phantom exercise. At the outset the President set limits to the debate when he proposed that nearly 90 percent of a $4.9 billion program go to arms and defense support arising from our military alliances. Accepting the President's ground rules Congress has shadow-boxed over a program that should have been challenged in its fundamentals.

We are victims of a time lag which commits us to carry out in 1957 programs conceived in the Appropriations Committees of the Korean War period. While post-Stalin Soviet emissaries are turning aid and trade to political advantage throughout Asia and the Middle East, the United States remains constricted by the assumptions of earlier years. With or without cuts, the Mutual Security Act of 1956 will serve at best as a stop-gap.

## *"Beware that Candidate"*

Two North Carolina Congressmen have been politically beheaded because they did not sign the Southern Manifesto. Other factors may have entered the equation, but it is safe to say that Congressmen Thurmond Chatham and C. B. Deane would have been re-elected if they had conformed. It is jarring to see such naked racism in the most advanced state in the South, in a community benefiting for so long a time from the benign influence of the University of North Carolina.

We were forewarned, to be sure, by the defeat of Frank P. Graham, when he sought to retain the Senate seat to which he had been appointed after many years as president of the University. Graham was badly beaten because he was held to be "soft" on the Negro question. Now we have more reason than ever to believe that, in spite of its prosperity, passion for education and cultural progress, North Carolina is not so far ahead of the rest of the South politically as might have been expected. It is a melancholy fact that, even in a state so proud of its colleges, enlightenment can not hold its own against the poison of prejudice. Wisconsin's experience is being repeated. After all that the university in Madison had done to emancipate the mind and spirit of the people of Wisconsin, along came McCarthy to prove that what had been taken for a deep ferment was just so much froth.

The saddest implication of the defeat of the Tarheel representatives is that it will make Southern politicians continue shouting for segregation as though it were the end-all and be-all of statesmanship. Even men of natively larger outlook will stay in that groove indefinitely They have seen too many instances of what happens to candidates suspected of not being unreservedly committed to the prevailing pattern.

In the recent Alabama primary, Lister Hill was re-elected, but he lost many votes merely because he has been operating in Washington. He was conspicuously among the Manifesto signers, but that did not protect him from a distrust which recent agitation has generated. For the same reason, John Sparkman polled a smaller vote than did ex-Representative Laurie Battle in the race for delegate to the Democratic convention. Both Alabama Senators suffered from having the sin of geographical association imputed to them. Some Alabamians find it hard to understand why their Senators did not prevent the Supreme Court from rendering that dastardly de-segregation decision.

If that seems incredible, consider this classic statement from the Gospel according to St. Herman (Talmadge), aimed at Sen. Walter George:

> No candidate will dare advocate publicly the end of segregation. To do that would mean his sure defeat. However, there is a type candidate [*sic*] who will make deals, sacrifice principles and sell out, while giving lip-service to our cause. Beware that candidate! He is the most dangerous. He is the thief in the night, clothed in garments of sweet lip-service, but whose raiment, we know from costly experience, conceals the deadly dagger of treachery. (*You and Segregation,* by Herman E. Talmadge, p. 78.)

So John Sparkman is outdistanced by a man whom he thoroughly trounced only two years ago when Battle ran against him for the Senate. This happened not because Sparkman had been less than "correct" on the segregation issue, but because he had not been another Eastland. The crowd must have emphatic warrant, said Robert Browning. That is particularly true when the Southern radicals are having a field day among overwrought voters given to looking askance at anyone who has an office in the general vicinity of the Supreme Court of the United States.


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

# The Soviet Union Since Stalin

***What is the nature of recent changes?***

***What US policy revisions are in order?***

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# Americans and Russians

by GEORGE KENNAN



WHEN, in February of this year, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles claimed that it was the strength and unity of the free world which had forced the Russians to "revamp their whole creed, from A to Z," and that the Soviets "have failed. . . . They are in a very bad way," George Kennan's comment was: "I do not recognize the world Mr. Dulles is talking about."

Mr. Kennan accompanied the first US Ambassador to the USSR in 1933, serving thereafter in Moscow as Ambassador in 1952. He was the Department of State Counselor and chief long-range Adviser to the Secretary in 1949-50. Under the pseudonym of "X", Mr. Kennan wrote the first definitive article on the containment of Soviet power, in the July, 1947, issue of *Foreign Affairs.* There he declared that "there will always be Americans, who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that 'the Russians have changed', and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such 'changes'. But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers.

"It is clear," he commented in 1947,

> that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.

NO ONE is more pleased and encouraged than I am about the changes that have recently occurred in Russia. They have unquestionably helped to reduce world tension. They represent, I think, the beginning of that mellowing process which overtakes sooner or later all military movements and which has been the source of hope for many of us who refused, in the darker moments, to take a despairing view of the Soviet problem. These changes point the way to a lifting, in considerable degree, of the Iron Curtain, to the restoration of a more normal and hopeful relationship of the Russian people to their world environment, and to us in particular. I think all this has important and even, in some respects, exciting possibilities. But we should not exaggerate them. We would be ill advised to ignore the very real differences of historical experience and tradition and outlook that still divide us from the Russian people and would continue to divide us even under the most liberal conceivable Russian regime. We Americans have a tendency to hazy and exalted dreams of intimacy with other peoples; and the farther away those peoples are from us both in physical distance and in historical tradition the more we like to picture ourselves as associated with them in some sort of rosy nirvana of intimacy and comradeship. This has applied particularly, over the past hundred years, to our feelings about the Russians and Chinese.

I sometimes wonder whether these dreams of intimacy with what we regard as the humble and oppressed peoples of the earth do not represent a form of rebellion against the older European peoples who were, in a sense, the parents of this country. Perhaps we Americans, having once been the child of older nations, have a subconscious yearning, now, to play the father to someone else, in order to prove to ourselves the reality of our maturity and the finality of our liberation from the apron strings of old Europe. However this may be, our dreams of possible association with the Russian and Chinese peoples have been unrealistic and a little silly: unjust to those peoples because we attributed to them by implication a helplessness and weakness and dependence that really did not exist.

Great damage can be done in international life, as in personal life, by the attempt to push intimacy beyond the point warranted by the real prerequisites of taste and outlook and experience. There are ways of looking at things and reacting to things about the Russian people which will always be strange to Americans and will always tend to arouse our resentment if we become too closely involved in their affairs. The same is no less true conversely. If, on the other hand, we keep our distance and concede to them the privilege of their privacy and their differentness, as we would like to have it conceded to us, being prepared to reserve judgment on that which we cannot understand and which need not concern us, I can see no reason why a satisfactory and hopeful relationship should not be established between the United States and Russia, even though the respective social systems and political philosophies remain theoretically in conflict.

But then we must both take care to be modest in the demands we place on each other. If we can move in this direction, I am of good heart about the possibilities for the remote future in our relations with Russia.

*May, 1956*

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*A NARRATIVE OF EVENTS*

# From 1953 to the Present

by MERLE FAINSOD

COMPARED with the glacial silences of the Stalinist era, the mood of post-Stalinist Russia is one of ferment and change. People breathe more freely and speak more freely. There is less fear of contact with foreigners, more disposition to probe the limits of dissent and apparently less concern for the consequences. But there are also contradictory trends. The major domestic policy choices of the new rulers—the resumption of the heavy industry drive, the decision to tighten agricultural controls by squeezing out the private garden plots and increasing the number of compulsory work days for collective farmers, the reassertion of the supremacy of the Party and the insistence on maintaining its monolithic unity—all these represent a fundamental dedication to Stalinist goals which the deflation of the Stalin myth cannot wholly obscure. Within the framework of these basic commitments the new collective dictatorship is presently experimenting with methods of rule which place less emphasis on police surveillance and terror and more reliance on incentives, the encouragement of initiative, and the assurance of at least a measure of security for the Soviet citizenry. What the consequences of these readjustments will be no man can know, perhaps least of all those who have launched the experiment. Have the new leaders set forces in motion which will ultimately erode their own totalitarian edifice or will they, like Stalin before them, reverse course and apply ruthless repression at the first sign that their authority is imperilled?

The sequence of events since Stalin's death does not yield self-evident answers. The first response of Stalin's lieutenants was to submerge their differences and to rally the forces of national unity around party and government. The old Politburo stalwarts moved into their agreed places at the head of the party and governmental machine. Faced with the uncertainties of the transition period and the necessity of wooing popular support, they quickly embarked on a policy of concessions and relaxation of pressure. Peace and the advancement of popular welfare became the key slogans of the new regime. On March 27, 1953, the amnesty decree was announced. On April 1 came the news of a substantial cut in retail prices. On April 3 the Kremlin doctors were released, and *Pravda* promised that all cases of official "high handedness and lawlessness" would be rooted out. "Great Russian distortions" in nationality policy were denounced, and instructions were issued to revive the use of minority languages and to enlist nationality representatives in the service of the Party and government. The campaign culminated in Malenkov's address to the Supreme Soviet on August 8 in which he elaborated government plans to expand the production of consumer goods, to improve housing, and to provide additional incentives to encourage agricultural output. The New Course, as it came to be called, represented a deliberate effort on the part of the regime to placate discontent and to win a breathing space to consolidate its authority.

Meanwhile, there was trouble at the summit. The surface show of unity was suddenly shattered when the Soviet press revealed on July 10, 1953, that Beria had been arrested and expelled from the Party as an enemy of the people. The catalogue of Beria's crimes, including his alleged service as a British agent, was a melodramatic recital in the best tradition of the Stalinist purge trials of the thirties; the subsequent liquidation of Beria and his leading aids was executed with typical Stalinist dispatch and ruthlessness. At the same time the new leadership made skillful use of Beria's elimination to symbolize its repudiation of Beria's police methods. Announcements were made that the power of the security police would be curbed, and a new campaign was inaugurated to restore "socialist legality."

SINCE the purge of Beria and his entourage, the resolution of differences within the Soviet high command has followed a more placid course. Khrushchev's election in September, 1953, as First Secretary of the Party Central Committee marked the emergence of a new star in the Soviet constellation of power. During the next year he gradually displaced Malenkov as the chief spokesman of the Party leadership. The redistribution of authority was confirmed at the February, 1955, session of the Supreme Soviet when Malenkov was forced to retire as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and was re-

MERLE FAINSOD *is a professor at Harvard University's Russian Research Center, the author of* How Russia Is Ruled, *and former editor of the* American Political Science Review.

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placed by Bulganin on Khrushchev's nomination. Despite expectations abroad that Malenkov would follow Beria to the grave, this time there was no bloodletting and no suggestion of treason or espionage. Malenkov was made the scapegoat for agricultural failures and demoted, but he remained a member of the Party Presidium. His survival seemed to indicate that, unlike Beria, he posed no real threat to his colleagues in the Presidium. His retention, moreover, served the useful function of signifying to the outside world that the leadership, in Malenkov's words, remained "monolithic in its unity and singleness of purpose."

The rise of the Khrushchev-Bulganin team was also marked by a decline in Molotov's status. In the fall of 1955 he was publicly rebuked and forced to apologize for an alleged ideological error made in an earlier speech in which he had diverged from the usual formula of celebrating the achievement of socialism in the USSR to proclaim that the Soviet Union had only built the foundations of a socialist society. At the Twentieth Party Congress he was again criticized for the rigidity of his conduct of foreign policy. It remains to be seen whether these public attacks mirror differences of view within the ruling group and whether they foreshadow the relegation of Molotov to a more honorific and less responsible role in the Soviet power structure.

The information available to outside observers does not permit a precise description of the relationships which prevail within the Kremlin circle. In the Soviet system conflicts rarely rise to full visibility until issues have been resolved. Despite many indications of Khrushchev's rising prominence, the attack on the cult of the individual at the 20th Congress would appear to raise a powerful barricade against the emergence of another Stalinesque figure. Over the near term, it must be assumed that the theory and practice of collective dictatorship will be maintained.

Purge of 1956

MORE important than the parade of personalities are the issues which have agitated the Soviet scene since Stalin's death. On the economic plane, these have largely centered on the priority to be accorded heavy industry as against the production of consumer goods and on schemes for stimulating a substantial increase in agricultural output. On the political plane, they have involved an effort to reinvigorate the Party and to redefine its relationships to the police, the state bureaucracy and the armed forces. On the legal front, the focal problem has been the so-called struggle for legality, the campaign to prune the power of the security police, and to provide safeguards for the exercise of bureaucratic initiative. On the ideological front, the issue has been one of shedding Stalinist rigidities while still maintaining the authority of the ruling group to serve as the ultimate custodian of orthodox doctrine.

The policy choices of the Soviet rulers thus far do not lend themselves to easy categorization. In the first year after Stalin's death, the so-called Malenkov era, "liberalizing" tendencies appeared to be in the ascendant. The consumer-goods campaign, the emphasis on greater incentives in agriculture, the amnesty decree, the promise of a new criminal code, the curbs on the security police, the thaw in literature and other similar developments seemed to presage a rapid mellowing of the dictatorship and led some hopeful observers to salute the imminent democratization of Soviet society.

The record since is more enigmatic. The repudiation of the consumer-goods campaign and the signal for the resumption of the heavy industry drive which was given by Khrushchev in his speech to the Central Committee on January 25, 1955, marked a rededication to the goals of development which Stalin had championed. The series of agricultural reforms proclaimed by Khrushchev, while retaining and even expanding incentives to stimulate agricultural productivity, have also been accompanied by a strengthening of party controls in the countryside, an attack on the private garden plots of the collective farmers, and a deliberate effort to tighten collective farm discipline by increasing the minimum number of work days which collective farmers must contribute to the common enterprise. Readers of Stalin's Last Testament, *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, will recognize the source from which these inspirations derive.

But there are also countervailing tendencies. Under the aegis of

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Khrushchev and Bulganin the top-heavy over-centralization of the Stalinist era has been, at least partially, corrected by transferring more authority to the republics and the localities. Some steps have been taken to meet the demands of the new managerial group for greater functional autonomy. The prestige of the armed forces has been reinforced. But these measures have also been counterbalanced by an insistence on the Party's controlling role as the ultimate Ministry of Co-ordination. The powers of the security police have been curbed, but they remain in reserve, and Khrushchev chose the platform of the 20th Party Congress to remind his listeners that ". . . distrust for the workers of the State Security agencies . . . is incorrect and very harmful . . ." and that "we must in every way raise revolutionary vigilance among the Soviet people and strengthen the State Security agencies."

In the cultural realm there is a similar record of contradictory trends. The window to the West has been opened again, and the cultural obscurantism of latter-day Stalinism has been repudiated. Lysenko has received his long over-due comeuppance; and scientists rejoice in their new freedom. At the same time, the literary thaw has been arrested, and the 1954 Writers' Congress provided a reminder that craftsmen of the pen were still artists in uniform.

THE recently concluded 20th Party Congress confirms this impression of ambiguity. The demolition of the Stalin cult was accomplished at a Congress which was stage-managed in the best Stalinist tradition. Not a single discordant note was permitted to mar the sweet harmony of the performance.

Like Joseph Stalin before him, Khrushchev made clear that deviations from the Party line would not be tolerated, that the new leadership was determined to preserve its system of rule, that it remained committed to a program of intensive industrialization, and that it proposed to continue to press for the expansion of Communist power in the world. At the same time the promises held out at the Congress—higher pay and pensions for the lowest-paid workers, cuts in the work week, the abolition of tuition fees in all educational institutions, and the emphasis on the "new legality"—indicated that the new leadership was sensitive to the grievances of its constituency and that, willingly or unwillingly, it was responding to aspirations which were greatly suppressed during the Stalinist era.

The changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union in the last few years should, of course, not be underrated. By shedding the worst excesses of the Stalinist police state, by taking steps to empty the forced labor camps and to repair past injustices, the new regime opens up perspectives of development of which even the present leaders may be only dimly aware. Indeed in the eyes of some, the hopeful trends which have been set in motion already appear irreversible, and they count on time and the rise of new generations less committed to revolutionary messianism to induce a further relaxation of control and to promote the eventual disintegration of the whole totalitarian structure.

BUT lest our hopes flame too brightly, we need to remember that this is not the first quasi-liberal interlude in Soviet or Russian history, that the experience of the past has been one of alternating phases of pressure and relaxation, that great secular transformations take place slowly, and that the dynamism of Soviet Communism is still far from contained. Thus far at least, the Party's monopoly of power remains unimpaired. As long as the Party retains its grip on Soviet society, the end of Soviet totalitarianism is not in sight.

**The book that tells how anti-semitism is used today as a political weapon**

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*LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES*

# The Meanings of "Change"

by MARSHALL SHULMAN

OF THE VOCABULARY which recurs in the daily flow of commentary on the Soviet scene, perhaps no word has been used—or misused—more than the word "change." Newsmen and analysts frequently use the term "change" without clarifying, or perhaps being sure themselves, what they have in mind. This makes for confusion in their attempts to answer such questions as: Has there been a change in Soviet policy? Is the "new look" really new and, if so, when did it begin? Can the Soviet Union ever really change? Or is the answer that the more Soviet policy changes, the more it is the same?

In trying to arrive at meaningful answers to these questions, the first step is to differentiate between the various levels on which change can, and does take place.

There is, first of all, the level of atmospherics. In an age in which the practitioners of the art of manipulating public opinion have achieved great proficiency, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between appearance and reality. This is particularly true of the USSR. The fact is —and the world sometimes loses sight of it—that the air may be charged or not charged, without much change on the ground.

Is Mr. Molotov grim and forbidding, or is he donning cowboy hats at Cheyenne, visiting museums in New York and Chicago? Are the Soviet representatives chilly and isolated, or are they genially mixing, posing gladly for the photographers? Is the non-Communist world peopled by "fascist beasts" and "capitalist warmongers," or by good fellows who just happen to think differently? The unhappy truth is that the world public often helps to delude itself. Our hopes and our fears lead us to magnify each small sign of favor or of ferocity, until we lose sight of reality. One week the story of Quemoy and Matsu is bubbling furiously on the front page; the next week the furor has died out—without the actual situation having changed much one way or the other. Conversely, the Moscow leaders smile and "the whole world smiles with them"; without too much difficulty the Soviets create an atmosphere of *detente*—of relaxing tensions—without having to address themselves to the cause of tension.

This is not to say that atmospheric changes are not important. They are. They may be very significant as one index of the Soviet outlook at any given time. But unless they are related to something more substantive than manner, they signify only that the Soviet rulers wish to create a different atmosphere, either more militant, hostile and tense, or less so.

There is another level, somewhat more substantial, at which change takes place and which might be called "tactical." Flexibility in tactics, set forth by Lenin as a cardinal principle of effective action, has led to an alternation between periods of militancy and periods of broad co-operation. For example, is this a period in which the Soviet Union is joining, or walking out of, such groups as the World Health Organization or UNESCO? Is it granting visas to Western citizens, or is it keeping the Iron Curtain tight shut? More important, are foreign Communist parties being militant, tough, purist about their revolutionary doctrine and scornful of co-operation with the leaders of "bourgeois" groups? Or are they endeavoring to form United Fronts, Popular Fronts, National Fronts, or other forms of broad, collaborative action in the parliaments and in the trade union movement?

MOVING one level deeper, there is a change in Soviet policy which can be described as "strategic." It is never altogether clear where tactics leave off and strategy begins, but the distinction here is between the day-to-day operations in local situations and broad policy direction. In this sense, strategy chiefly reflects the Soviet estimate of the main characteristics of the current period of history. Is it a period of capitalist crises, when revolutionary possibilities seem in motion, and the time is ripe to press the advantage? Or is it a period of "temporary stabilization of capitalism," a period when the world power situation is adverse to Communist expansion?

In the former case, Soviet leaders stress the authority in Marxism-Leninism concerning the division of the world into two hostile camps; the "irreconcilability of the two systems," the "inevitability of conflict." In the latter case, authority is found for the doctrine of "peaceful co-existence of states having different social and political systems."

One point of confusion that arises here is that the nonmilitant strategy is sometimes spoken of as a "strategy of

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MARSHALL D. SHULMAN *is Associate Director of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. He has dealt with Russian problems as an Information Officer of the US Mission to the United Nations from 1948 to 1950, and from 1950 to 1953 as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.*

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retreat." This is not necessarily the case. In a time of the "temporary stabilization of capitalism," and the relative strengthening of the "capitalist camp," the Soviet Union may direct its energies to strategically defensive objectives—as, for example, the weakening of the Western defense alliance. This may involve a postponement of the fulfillment of affirmative Soviet objectives, but it represents a continuation of the struggle by other means.

THE three modes of change I have mentioned—atmospheric, tactical and strategic—have all varied on a cyclical pattern in the four decades of Soviet history. An atmosphere of *detente* has been followed by an atmosphere of tension; a tactic of co-operation by a tactic of militancy; a strategy of defense by a strategy of offense. It is, ironically, most often the people of good will who forget the cyclical character of these changes, and who take each favorable turn for a permanent change. Is there, then, no possibility of more fundamental change?

One approach to this problem is a utopian one. It is based upon a belief in the possibility of a sudden transformation in the situation. Before the Geneva meetings, it was frequently said: "Now we shall find out if the Soviet leaders really have had a change of heart." A variant form of the question, still being asked, and still not to the point, is: "Are the Soviet leaders really sincere about peace?" The question is irrelevant, for even if it could be demonstrated that the Soviet leaders prefer to achieve their objectives without war, as doubtless they do, it would not follow that these objectives were compatible with the survival of democratic societies, or conversely, that war could be excluded as an instrument of Soviet policy if their objectives could not be otherwise achieved.

What the utopian image connotes is the possibility in the near future of a radical transformation in the Soviet system, involving a drastic modification in Soviet objectives, an abandonment of Marxism-Leninism, of Communist analysis and expectations, of the Soviet form of government. It envisages a situation in which the USSR would have relationships of trust and confidence with other states; in which people, trade and ideas could move freely back and forth across her borders; in which the world level of armaments could be safely reduced; in which police state methods would no longer be used; in which neighboring states would be free to choose their own governments, and the anticipation of Soviet Communist world hegemony would be forever put aside. Much as one may pray for this ultimate outcome, one must be grateful to Khrushchev for reminding the world, as he did in speaking to the East German delegation to Moscow in September, that this will happen only "when the lobsters in the sea learn to whistle."

To expect the Soviet rulers to accept proposals which would, in fact, presuppose this kind of drastic transformation in their regime, is not warranted by any observation of the Soviet system. Such thinking is not only delusory, but dangerous, for it leads to an underestimation of the problem at hand.

There is, however, a fifth sense in which the word "change" can be used. It seems reasonable to believe that, like all other human organizations, Soviet society does not remain static, but continues to evolve. Four decades may be a short time to historians, but it is a long enough period to warrant consideration of what secular changes —that is, changes of a long-term, non-cyclical character —may be taking place in Soviet society, whether planned, unintended, or perhaps even unconscious.

It is now almost 40 years since the October Revolution. The present leadership, with a few exceptions, has not been a product of the conspiratorial pre-revolutionary experience. From a backward peasant society, the Soviet Union has been transformed into the second industrial power of the world. Its urban population has increased by 17 million even within the past five years. Literacy has increased enormously. It would be hard to believe that profound social changes were not taking place in the light of these developments.

When one tries to define such changes, and to describe their effects, however, one ventures into an area of speculation and of disagreement. Inferences must be drawn from the second-hand study of Soviet society through the Soviet press and literature, impressions of occasional visitors to the USSR, and interviews with former Soviet citizens, and the impression that emerges most clearly is that of a maturing society. The class strata appear to be more clearly defined and stabilized.

IN interviews of a large number of former Soviet citizens, Harvard University's Project on the Soviet Social System made the striking finding that attitudes corresponded less with such factors as age, sex, politics, arrest experience, and even nationality, than they did with the factor of class identification. That is to say, if one knew whether an individual thought of himself as a peasant, an unskilled laborer, a skilled workman, or a member of the intelligentsia, one could fairly well chart out the pattern of his responses to a variety of questions about the regime, the society, the police, the government, family relations, living conditions.

It appears probable that there is less mobility between the classes than was the case 20 years ago, but whether the wide spread of income distribution and the opportunity of privileged groups to pass on certain advantages to their children is resulting in a hardening class structure is a matter of interpretation. Such studies as we have of generational differences in the Soviet Union show a much higher degree of matter-of-fact acceptance of the regime and its propaganda among those age 20 than among those who are 40.

One of the fascinating questions in this connection is the effect which increasing industrialization and urbanization may be having on the Soviet society. It seems

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Host Bulganin at his country estate. Left to right: First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, Foreign Minister Molotov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, First Deputy Premier Kaganovich, Mikhail Peruvkin (Minister of Electric Power and Industry), Former Premier Malenkov.

reasonable to conjecture that the process of industrialization is developing a technical intelligentsia, with some of the aspirations, tastes and demands of industrial middle classes elsewhere. There has been some discussion whether this did or did not mean a new bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union, and a new Victorian Age to go with it. The irony, from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, of having a bourgeois revolution follow a proletarian revolution has not escaped non-Soviet observers.

When it comes to the effect of these developments, if they do in fact exist, another area of uncertainty must be traversed. It is possible that Soviet citizens who are primarily production men, managers and technicians may have, within their general loyalty to the Soviet system, somewhat separable interests from those who have come up primarily through the party ranks. It seems likely, as interviews have suggested, that the production people press for a reduction of arbitrariness, of political interference in their operations, and that they can make a good case for increasing rationality in the Soviet system if high production goals are to be realized. It is also possible that, as consumers, these well-rewarded technicians—the so-called *dacha* (or villa) set—may strengthen the demand for consumer goods.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that a separate managerial class will emerge to challenge party leadership. The party has shown great care in absorbing into itself such separate interests as the army and the technicians. In his report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February, Khrushchev strongly reproved party leaders "who hold that party work is one thing and economic and government work quite another," and who complain of "being diverted from so-called 'pure party' work and are made to study economics, technology and agronomy and to study production." Successive Party Congresses have shown a rising level of age and educational experience among party officials, and among the members of the present party Presidium are men whose experience has been primarily as production experts. To the extent that a pluralism of interests may develop from the process of industrialization, it seems quite possible that these separable interests will contend with each other within the party, and not outside or against the party. The effect of this process, if any, might be a modification of party policies rather than a weakening of the party position.

Even if all this were to come about, the unanswerable question remains whether such modifications in the direction of a more rational order would soften, or merely internalize, the instrument of terror; whether it would result in a less expansionist Soviet state, or a more efficient and ultimately more dangerous one.

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A retrospective study of Soviet foreign policy since the end of World War II suggests that the main watershed for present developments is to be found in the 1949-50 period. Most of the developments since that time represent not new departures but successive experimentation and refinements in doctrine and methods. In brief, the period from 1947 to 1949 had been one in which Soviet policy reflected an open hostility, aimed at maximizing the advantages of the molten power situation in the postwar world. The satellization of Eastern Europe, the incitement of violent strikes in Western Europe, the organization of the Cominform around the "two hostile camps" doctrine, the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the violent language of hatred, irreconcilable conflict and revolutionary advance —these characterized Soviet policy in the two-year period which marked the most intense and overt phase of the so-called "Cold War."

By 1949-50, it had become apparent that this policy was producing adverse effects from the Soviet point of view. The Berlin blockade had ended in failure and had clearly demonstrated the willingness of the Western powers to resist Communist expansion at the cost of war if necessary. Western Europe had begun its economic recovery, and as a consequence had regained a degree of political stability. Soviet hostility had driven the Western powers into an unprecedented degree of cohesion.

INSTEAD of withdrawing from Europe, as might have been anticipated, the United States was now firmly committed to remain, and was in the process of organizing close political, economic and military bonds with the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe. The Brussels Pact, the Western Union, the Marshall Plan, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and finally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was beginning efforts to incorporate Western German military power into its orbit, constituted a trend which would in time alter the power relationships in Europe to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. To match the Soviet stress on development of military potential, the military budgets of the United States and the Western European powers were being raised to unprecedented peacetime levels. All of these developments were clear reactions to the overt hostility of Soviet policy in the preceding period.

In taking stock of their situation, the Soviet leaders were able to include two favorable developments in 1949: the triumph of the Chinese Communists and the explosion of a Soviet atomic weapon. Each of these events had profound consequences. The rise of Mao created new possibilities and new problems in the East. The development of Soviet atomic capabilities began to alter the mood, and consequently the political configuration, of the European picture as neutralism became a significant factor.

The attack on Korea in June, 1950, while it appeared to many at the time as another manifestation of militant Soviet policy, may in fact have been more significant as a step toward exploiting the dynamism of the Asian movement as against the relatively static European situation. Since it had the effect of intensifying Western reaction to Soviet militancy to an extraordinary degree, it may have hastened a re-evaluation by the Soviet Union of the effect of its previous policies, and made more urgent the introduction of alternative policies.

WHAT followed was a period of Kremlin experimentation with policies designed to check the adverse trend, at the same time making use of favorable developments. There were some regressions to the old militancy in this period, but whether they were attributable, as a few observers have held, to factional disputes within the Soviet leadership must remain a matter of opinion. In any event, by the fall of 1952, the new policy had been developed, and in October was formulated at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, before Stalin's death. With some modifications, but with considerably more flexibility and deftness in application, essentially the same policy has continued in force since the death of Stalin.

The post-Stalin leadership has been more consistent, more thorough, more sensitive to the actual conditions of the outside world, and consequently more successful in creating an atmosphere of *detente*. It would be difficult, for example, to visualize Stalin making the trip to Belgrade to attempt to undo the Tito episode, and it is clear that Stalin's arbitrary and autocratic rule of the party leadership was among the "obsolete ideas" which Khrushchev, at the 20th Congress, said the party had resolutely swept aside, "as a brake on our forward movement." These changes of manner are of great importance, but the main lines of analysis and of policy formulated in the latter days of Stalin remain in force. The modifications of doctrine, presented at the 20th Congress—such as the non-inevitability of war, the sanctioning of different paths to socialism, and the acceptance of the possibility of Soviet socialism coming to power by parliamentary means—are significant, but mainly as the elimination of hindrances to the fuller realization of the policy of co-existence and United Fronts.

At the strategic level, Soviet policy in this period is defensive in character. That is to say, its primary objective appears to be the negative one of checking and weakening the Western defense system. To do this, it is seeking to reduce United States power and influence in Europe, Africa and Asia, to eliminate air bases abroad, and to encourage centrifugal tendencies in the West[illegible] alliance. Minimally, it is seeking to deny the industr[illegible]

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resources and military capabilities of Western Germany and Japan to the Western alliance, and optimally, it may hope to gain the resources of these areas for the Soviet complex. In endeavoring to create a new status of friendly neutrality for the uncommitted states, the Soviet Union is also pursuing a policy of denial, to prevent the West from maintaining its position in Africa and Asia, and consequently to weaken the colonial powers and the United States. The appeal of Communism to neutral nations and neutralists individually is likely to be enormously enhanced by the recent suppression of the symbol of Stalinism.

This strategy is supported by non-militant tactics. The Communist movement has, in the words of Stalin at the 19th Party Congress, raised the banner of national independence, which the bourgeoisie had dropped. That is to say, it is using nationalism as an anti-coagulant in the non-Communist world, as for example, in helping to defeat the proposed European Defense Community, and in exacerbating colonial conflicts. It is collaborating with elements of the bourgeoisie on broad front programs—united, popular or national fronts—in order to bring about changes in the national policies of individual Western countries. It is making effective use of neutralism and the peace movement, to circumscribe the freedom of action of Western governments.

It should be noted that the primary function of the international Communist movement in this period is not to achieve power but to support Soviet policy by influencing the policies of the respective countries in such a way as to weaken the Western alliance. It should also be borne in mind that the fall in membership of the Communist parties, or the fall in readership of the Communist newspapers, should not be taken as indices of the reduction of influence of the Communist movement abroad; this is part of the price the Communist movement consciously pays for a prolonged period of non-militancy in behalf of political objectives.

These tactics in turn are supported by efforts to create an atmosphere of *detente*. The Soviet Union has eased a number of pressure points—as for example, Turkey, Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia; and it is endeavoring, by words and symbolic acts, to bring about a "reduction in international tensions": and the "peaceful co-existence of states having different social and political systems," to quote the motif of many speeches by Soviet leaders.

By stressing peaceful co-existence and reducing the fear of war, the Soviet Union helps to create a climate in which divergencies among the Western allies prosper and the will to build joint military strength is weakened. Also, by encouraging the West to reduce its military expenditures, the Soviet leaders believe they [redacted]e eliminating a prop which sustains the capitalist [redacted]conomies at their present high levels.

What, then, is the outlook for the future? Until future events cast further light on the present situation, it would be imprudent for the rest of the world to cast into discard four decades of Soviet behavior as irrelevant. Stalin's successors may trample his grave and his image, but who can say with assurance that Stalinism is beyond resurrection, or that his heirs are in fact less menacing than he? The penalty for rejoicing prematurely could be severe. The only prudent approach is to assume, until events demonstrate the contrary, that in scrapping Stalinism, the present leadership is seeking to remove a hindrance to the more effective prosecution of its persistent goals.

If the present terms of conflict, somewhat muted and altered as they are, can be prolonged for an indefinite period, it is at least a possibility that over a period of time there may result an abandonment in fact of the Soviet commitment to an ideology of conflict and of world Communism. As a goal, this does not give much comfort to those who desire their solutions neat, but in the nature of things, we are dealing with possibilities, not certainties.

In endeavoring to prolong the policy which the Soviets call "peaceful co-existence," we should be under no illusions as to what the term means to the Moscow leaders. It does not mean peace as we understand the word. It means a continuation of the struggle on political and economic grounds. It could mean an alternative route for the Soviet Union to a dominant world power position.

It may be, over a period of time, that some of the causes of tension—as distinguished from the atmosphere of tension—will yield to negotiations, and settlements can be worked out which transpose the power relationship issue into a lower key. Any such settlements, which resulted, for example, in an actual and verified reduction of armaments and armed forces, or which satisfactorily disposed of the specific territorial issues where the respective power spheres are in contact—as, for example, Germany, Korea, Formosa or Indo-China—would be major settlements and would deserve to be given more weight in judging the fundamental relationship than such peripheral agreements as the Austrian treaty.

Our experience has taught us that we can expect such fundamental settlements, much as we may desire them, only when Soviet interests require them. Undoubtedly the most decisive instrument for bringing this to pass would be the existence of thriving economic and political relations between the non-Communist nations of the world.

The real question is thus whether the free world will understand and accept the requirements of this period in history, and make of it an advantage rather than a disaster.

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*THE CHALLENGE TO WESTERN SUPREMACY*

# Soviet Military Power

by KLAUS KNORR

THE OUTSTANDING event in the world military picture during the last half-decade is the amazing and unexpected swiftness with which Soviet airpower has come close to catching up with the airpower of the United States. The American monopoly of nuclear power has been giving way to a nuclear stalemate between the two countries. Self-assured Soviet declarations to this effect have been confirmed by many Western experts and, most recently, in Senate hearings on the adequacy of our defense effort. Looking over the entire air weapons spectrum—atomic and thermonuclear bombs of varying sizes and kinds, types of bombers and fighting planes, warning systems and civil defense, electronic and ballistic missiles —it is very likely that the Soviet Union is ahead of us in the development and output of some items. Whether or not the Russians have achieved over-all equality—or will do so in one or two years—is a question that is necessarily controversial and, in fact, unanswerable. With approaching balance, no reliable test for the whole military setup exists, other than war. Stalin's demise and the subsequent changes in Soviet leadership have been immaterial to this dramatic growth in Russian military power.

The salient implication of this situation is unmistakable to anyone prepared to face facts. Full-fledged war between the two great powers will be devastating to both. There is no wholly reliable security for either country, and such security against mutilation as is possible rests on will and ability to deter, that is, to effect instant and massive retaliation against all-out atomic attack. This is the way the problem looks to both American and Russian leaders. Hence, the arms race between the United States and the USSR is now concentrating primarily on air-atomic power. In all probability, it is going to be a prolonged and grueling race. There is no need for either nation to match or exceed the other's armory in every component so long as the deterrent threat of retaliation is safeguarded. But neither country will want to let the other forge ahead decisively in offensive striking force or air defense lest its capability to deter cease to be sufficient.

Nor is it only nuclear airpower that is in question. So long as massive reprisal must be expected, resort to the strategic air arm is far too costly to be justified in any but the most desperate circumstances. In order to be prepared to employ military means in more limited engagements, and not in such cases face the alternative of retreat or threat of the Big Bang, the United States, and the Soviet Union as well, must possess an adequate complement of tactical airpower and surface forces of high firepower and mobility. Barring effective disarmament—a subject to be discussed in the last third of this article—we will therefore be confronted indefinitely with the need for an unrelenting defense effort and with a cruel diplomatic dilemma.

The arms race will be highly exacting of will power, brains and treasure for three reasons. First, the rate of technological development in the construction and application of weapons is extremely rapid, and so is obsolescence of past output. Second, neither country can afford to lag appreciably in the race. Third, neither country can be sure of just how far the other has progressed. Unless the Soviet political and economic system develops serious internal weaknesses—and there is now no evidence of this—Russia can nourish its staying power with formidable resources. While her industrial capacity is at present only between one-third and one-half that of the United States, and closer to one-third than to one-half, Russia's is likely to grow much more rapidly than ours in the foreseeable future. Although the Soviet leaders may find it expedient to raise per-capita levels of consumption, their political authority, if it remains basically what it is now, is so strong that they can allocate to defense a larger proportion of the national product than American Presidents and Congresses will be able to withdraw from private use.

THESE expectations suggest a somber future. We shall continue to expend enormous resources in order to maintain an air-atomic stalemate that is likely, but not certain, to save us from the awful choice between capitulation and the horror of all-out nuclear war. Is there no better alternative? Is Sen. Walter George right when he believes United States policy to suffer "from a certain negativism and drift," and calls for a more hopeful and affirmative policy in the Cold War (*New*

KLAUS KNORR *is Professor of Public and International Affairs at the Center of International Studies, Princeton. He contributed two chapters to the recent book* Military Policy and National Security. *His* The War Potential of Nations *will be published shortly.*

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*York Times,* May 18, 1956)? And what of our non-Communist critics in Western Europe who, at their most extreme, reproach the United States for still responding to old and routine reflexes of fear and suspicion, who call NATO a clumsy anachronism and threaten us with an "agonizing reappraisal"? It is such charges—widespread abroad, though generally couched in more moderate terms—that circumscribe our diplomatic dilemma.

With the exception of an effective scheme for total or partial disarmament, there is only one condition, in strict logic, under which the race in military capabilities can be called off or at least materially reduced, and it is worth stating flatly. Assuming that the West does not want to fall under the military mercy of the Soviet bloc, it can relax its defense effort, even unilaterally, only if its leaders believe that Soviet intentions preclude military aggression. Be it noted immediately, the Russian leaders are apparently incapable of such an act of faith in the peaceful intentions of the West, although nearly all of us feel sure that our intentions are precisely of this kind.

What reasons do we have for believing that the intentions of the Soviet Government are essentially peaceful? Of course, there are many hopeful signs that the Soviet regime is involved in a remarkable process of change which, if it continues, is apt to reduce the differences between the Eastern and Western systems. It is possible—indeed, very likely—that the Communist rulers are far from considering the possibility of initiating a major military aggression. But even if this be true, we do not know whether this attitude is of a basic and enduring disposition or whether it stems from their recognition of the air-atomic stalemate. We do not know that this attitude would persist if the West were to lower its defenses or that, at least temporarily, internal changes in the USSR might not throw up new and more aggressive leaders. There are surely grounds for prudence and distrust. It is all very well to argue, as some Socialists in Western Europe do, that this is the time for the West to be imaginative, generous and daring. Distrust can be unreasonable and sterile. But history is full of instances—some rather recent—in which lack of reasonable distrust begot disaster.

THE inescapable point is that we do not know what Soviet intentions are or will be in the future. And if we guess wrong and walk out of the arms race, the penalty is that we shall be at the mercy of Soviet military might. Military technology has advanced to a stage at which it is impossible to recover quickly from the consequences of error, to mobilize war potential speedily, or to trade space for the time needed for mobilization. The vitals of Western societies can be hit from Soviet Russia in a matter of hours. The risk of guessing wrong as to Soviet intentions may look small to those disaffected groups in the West which see little to choose between the political, social and economic order they now live under and the order that might come into being in a Soviet-dominated world. The risk looks appalling to those who prefer their present system.

In fact, European pressure for a new look at the military problem is not always based on coldly reasoned assessment of the facts. In part, it springs from a desperate desire to escape from the shadow of the hydrogen bomb. It is fed by impatience with paying the high price of defense. It is compounded by the anti-American resentment which is the consequence of Western Europe's prolonged dependence on American power, aid and occasionally harsh and tactless advice. It is encouraged by the peaceful tenor of Soviet declarations. Finally, this Western European pressure does not risk the military security of these countries so long as the United States refuses to yield to it. It is safer to be "neutralist" in a world in which two great powers maintain a military balance than in a world in which one great power is militarily supreme.

IN THESE circumstances, the United States must occupy the unenviable position of staying in the arms race and prodding its more or less reluctant allies to maintain their defenses in the face of a widespread popular yearning to be rid of the terrible specter of nuclear war. This is a diplomatic dilemma of the first order, and bearing it will often be a grim and exasperating task. Neutralism is growing in the Far East and the Icelandic desire to see the "Yankees go home" is only one symptom of the waning European support of NATO.

Despite these arguments in support of the American determination to provide for defense, there is a great deal of sense in foreign as well as American criticism of our military and foreign policy. To say that the United States is behaving responsibly in maintaining its military strength is not to say that this country should overemphasize, or seem to overemphasize, reliance on military means in coping with actual or potential Communist threats. To do so leaves the diplomatic dilemma unalleviated. The United States cannot, of course, conceal its defense effort, and it cannot stimulate the flagging efforts of some of its allies without pointing to the need for defense and for a reasonable distrust of Soviet intentions, even though doing so is widely unpopular in the outside world. However, this widespread longing for the miracle of durable peace, and the skill with which Soviet diplomacy appeals to it, require the United States to refrain from appearing to depend chiefly on the military instrument in its avowed attempt to contain Communist expansions. The American push for military alliances and bases is unhappily too conspicuous a part of United States foreign policy.

Nor is it only a question of appearances. The destructiveness of war has grown so immensely that the unlimited use of military power has become self-defeating

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in all but the most desperate circumstances, and even its strictly limited use can be contemplated only under dangerous risk and with corresponding circumspection. The general usefulness of war in the pursuit of national interests has sharply declined in the atomic age; a quantum jump has manifested itself in this respect, too. And this means a relative increase in the usefulness of non-military instruments—diplomacy, propaganda and economic means. In exercising the required shift from military to non-military means, the United States has thus far shown a great deal less imagination and flexibility than the USSR, and this failure is strongly registered in the criticism we have received both from NATO partners and from neutral nations.

Clearly, the shift should be undertaken with dispatch and ingenuity. Whether or not it should find institutional expression in a revamping of NATO is a different and controversial question. Among the obstacles to such a course, one has escaped attention. In any but the military field, the United States has found it difficult to integrate its policy-making with that of its allies except on an ad-hoc basis. It is clear that American Congresses have been in no mood to limit American freedom of action to the extent which any effective degree of institutional policy integration would demand. Beyond this insufficient readjustment in the technical uses of influence (and beyond the scope of this article) is the basic lack of ideological affinity between present American aspirations, largely negative in the foreign field, and the aspirations of the majority of mankind.

DISARMAMENT is the means proposed for terminating, or at least moderating, the arms race. Despite occasional hopeful signs, however, disarmament conferences have so far ended in deadlock. The crucial reason for this series of failures is fairly clear. Given their mutual distrust of one another's intentions, neither the United States nor Soviet Russia will contemplate arms reductions that will be uncertain to yield roughly equal cuts in capability and that might, indeed, let the other power win the race via ineffective disarmament. The shifts in the Russian and American positions are instructive on this point. For instance, before she was on the way to catching up with the United States in air-atomic power, Soviet Russia stressed the need for outlawing nuclear weapons as a prerequisite to any reduction in conventional forces in which she enjoyed preponderance. Now that she is achieving the capacity to strike mortal blows directly at the American mainland, the Soviet Union shows little interest in immediate nuclear disarmament and instead pushes cuts in conventional forces in terms of manpower.

But while further manpower cuts would seriously weaken American capability, particularly in view of the far-flung establishments we maintain in Western Europe and elsewhere, they are unlikely to diminish Soviet military strength. The Soviet Union not only has the obvious advantage of cutting military manpower down from a larger total than the American. It also enjoys interior lines of communication for the quick redeployment of divisions and can count on the sizable forces of its allies and satellites. Furthermore—and this is probably the chief reason for the unilateral manpower cuts recently announced by the USSR—Soviet Russia is in the process of readapting its military establishment to the needs of nuclear warfare, tactical as well as strategic. This reorganization implies the change from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive surface forces. With far greater amounts of equipment per soldier, fewer soldiers are needed in the armies, and more workers in the factories. *The reductions in Soviet military personnel, therefore, are calculated to increase rather than decrease military power.*

Soviet Navy fresco jet fighters passing over a Russian Skorijy-class destroyer.

Substantial disarmament is acceptable to either the USSR or the United States only if it produces no adverse change in the balance of military strength. If one country were to evade the control mechanism, it would achieve military strength. If one country were to evade the control mechanism, it would achieve military preponderance of a dimension unprecedented in the pre-atomic age. One of the key troubles is that, at the present stage of scientific knowledge, finished nuclear bombs can be readily hidden. Therefore, unless each country has complete faith in the goodwill of the other, control requires a degree of au-

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thority that is grossly incompatible with present concepts and practices of national sovereignty. To be effective, the control authority would either have to possess powers in each country sufficient to interdict the use of at least nuclear missiles anywhere, or it itself would need a sufficiency of external deterrent power. To state this prerequisite is to require a political miracle.

No doubt, the negotiation of partial measures of disarmament remains worthwhile and is not foredoomed to failure. Both big powers have certain interests in common, such as curtailing the strain that the arms race places on their national economy, representing themselves favorably to a world largely eager for relief from military conflict, and preventing the uncontrolled emergence of nuclear weapons in the rest of the world. Thus, some cuts in military manpower and budgets and in certain weapons categories may eventually prove feasible, and so might a mutual ban on nuclear weapons tests. Such measures would offer a measure of relief, but would scarcely make appreciable inroads on the risk of modern war.

There is likewise merit in the "burglar alarm" proposed by the United States. Compounded of various elements, notably aerial reconnaissance and ground inspection of military facilities, this system is not one of disarmament. It is designed to make surprise attack difficult and thereby to diminish the likelihood of full-fledged war. This objective is very sensible. But the establishment of such a warning system also calls for an unprecedented intrusion of national sovereignty. It remains to be seen whether the great powers will accommodate themselves to paying this price. If they do, a half-miracle will have occurred and the prospects for an effective disarmament scheme will then look that much less chimerical.

Until this happens, the arms race is likely to go on in one form or another. If it does, some of the runners may drop out from sheer exhaustion or disgust. But the USSR and the United States will hardly do so and, without effective armaments control, nuclear weapons will not remain the exclusive possession of the few nations that now possess them. This suggests another nightmare. To be sure, nuclear weapons in the hands of *some* smaller nations might add to the deterrent power that reduces the likelihood of military aggression. A few atomic bombs in Sweden or Switzerland would be no cause for alarm. But not all countries share the relevant predispositions of the Swedes and Swiss. It is possible that this unwelcome prospect will drive the nuclear powers to set up an international scheme to prevent such a development. However, if such a scheme only freezes the nuclear status quo, the big problem will remain essentially untouched. Perhaps at least a half-miracle will somehow occur.

***PROGRESS, THOUGH NOT PROSPERITY***

# A Survey of the Economy

**by HUGH MASSINGHAM**

JUST BEFORE Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev arrived in London the British received an unpleasant shock. Serov, the Russian security chief, arrived by air in a jet air liner that the experts acknowledged was the finest in the world with the possible exception of the Comet.

This revelation came as no surprise to those of us who have long felt that the West has been suffering from a dangerous delusion. Ever since the 1917 revolution it has smugly assumed that whatever else might be true about the Russians, they would always lag behind economically. The new Soviet jet demonstrated quite clearly that, in this field, the Soviets were not behind the West either in inventive skill or engineering craftsmanship. Some of the pessimists came to an even more shattering conclusion. The time might not be far off, they whispered, when Russia might overhaul the West industrially and so be able to outbid us for the favor of the backward countries.

Reliable facts about the Soviet economy are so hard to come by and interpret that two schools of theologians have arisen: at last year's Congress for Cultural Freedom in Milan, Mr. Peter Wiles warned us that Russia was not only advancing more rapidly than the West but had a system better suited to an expanding economy than Capitalism. Mr. Colin Clark, on the other hand, disagrees

HUGH MASSINGHAM *is political correspondent for* The Observer, *a leading British Sunday newspaper.*

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with Mr. Wiles and thinks that Russia's achievements have been exaggerated. The baffled layman may now perhaps turn with relief to a third pronouncement. This is a study of the Soviet economy that has just been presented by British bankers and will strike many people as one of the most objective and balanced statements yet published. It is written by Mr. A. Nove, an expert of high standing, and appears in the April, 1956, edition of *Lloyd's Bank Review*. The rest of this article will do no more than summarize Mr. Nove's analysis without attempting any comment.

His conclusion is neither so flattering as the fellow travelers would like nor so gloomy as a Western optimist would hope. He seems to accept Galenson's admirable American study of the Soviet economy—he agrees, in other words, that the productivity of Russian labor in 1937-39 was about 40 percent of the American figure. On this basis—and it is worth emphasizing that a contemporary Soviet statement reached the same conclusions as Galenson—Soviet productivity has now crept up to about 50 percent of the American rate and may be about the same as the British. If the American and Russian advance remains steady for a decade, Soviet productivity will be about 70 percent of America's by 1965. "This," the English bankers say, "probably is the uppermost point of the range of possibilities."

Some warning words follow, for the Soviet labor force is likely to expand faster than America's. Potentially, the Russians have a far larger reserve of industrial manpower than the United States. There are the millions in the concentration camps, the comparatively large number of people employed in agriculture, the swollen bureaucracy, and so on. For these and other reasons Russia has so far had fewer industrial workers than America. If the Soviets now tap their reserves, their industrial army will certainly be a good deal larger in a few years time.

Very cautiously, Mr. Nove assumes that in 1950 Russian output was about 35 percent of America's. On the basis of the last five years—that is to say, from 1950 to 1955—US industrial production should go up 24 percent by 1960. Mr. Nove then turns to the Russians. The Soviets claim that their output will increase by 85 percent during the same period—a figure that Mr. Nove does not accept. He prefers to argue that it will not be more than about 75 percent. Without going into all the niceties his conclusion is that "the USSR . . . may have reached America's present industrial output by about 1963." It will then, he adds, be "an industrial giant, *the* industrial giant of the Eurasian land mass. Her heavy industry should be capable of becoming a serious export competitor." And he ends his argument with words that no sensible person would surely contest:

> The conclusion is inescapable: the West faces a really serious challenge on the economic front. The Russian leaders have given notice that they regard this front as vital in the world of "competitive co-existence," and it would be foolish indeed, through over-concentration on military dangers or through obstinate complacency, to disregard the facts.

But it is Mr. Nove's analysis of the strength and weakness of the Russian economy that is so fascinating. Dictatorships always have certain advantages: Russia, for instance, can allocate a larger share of her resources to capital goods and investment than a democracy can. A democracy could not, as the Russians did in the early years after the revolution, finance its industrial expansion by fleecing the peasants: its government in power would have been afraid of losing the next election. Or take Stalin's policy just after the last war. "Whereas in Western countries," Mr. Nove says, "attention was concentrated on the rapid recovery of living standards, in the USSR there was actually a *larger* proportion of resources allocated to heavy industry than in prewar years. . . ." Nor are there any trade union watch-dogs as there are in a democracy. On the contrary the unions are used by the government to combat inertia and to report on the laggards.

It is not merely that the Soviets can ignore public opinion and sacrifice the consumer with impunity. They can also direct the flow of capital investment, concentrating on those sectors that will further encourage expansion: steel mills can be put high on the list of priorities and homes at the bottom.

> The entire system [Mr. Nove argues] is geared for expansion. Incentives, for workers and managers alike, tend to reward success disproportionately, and success is measured by the over-fulfilment of plans, which themselves are always fixed higher and higher. As a matter of routine, all production plans seem to be made up on the principle: whatever it is, produce more of it. [Vodka seems to be the one significant exception to this rule, its consumption on a large scale being considered, somewhat oddly, as a survival of Capitalism in the minds of men.] Financial results, while important, have always tended to be subordinate to the overriding aim of increasing production, and large losses have at various times been covered by substantial budgetary subsidies. The system of incentives has been used to encourage growth-inducing sectors; thus overfulfilment bonuses and progressive piece-work rates are much more "encouraging" in metallurgy and coal-mining than, say, in the furniture and clothing industries.

Mr. Nove thinks that the West has exaggerated the proportion that the Russians have put into armament production. Certainly there have been periods—1938-41 and 1950-53 are obvious examples—when the Soviets made great sacrifices and concentrated on military equipment. But, as Mr. Nove says, "the mere fact that industrial growth has continued at a very high level is proof that arms as such are not the dominant product of Soviet

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industry: guns do not produce anything. Indeed, a by-product of the creation of new industries of *potential* military significance has been a sharp increase in the output of some types of consumers' goods: the electronics and optical glass industries help to produce large quantities of TV sets and cameras. The Soviet economy is geared to growth first and foremost; if it were crudely and directly geared to arms manufacture our problem would be crudely and directly military, which is not the case."

As for the disadvantages, the obvious weakness is that the system inevitably produces over-centralization. The result is a bureaucracy that is inherently against new ideas and has, when things go wrong, to be purged before a fresh policy can be introduced. Enterprises sometimes cannot get their raw materials because of some muddle at the top, and either have to stop work or get what they want by bribes, bullying or other questionable means.



Russian engineers install units for separating stable isotopes.

Even the bonuses and incentives to managers sometimes produce very different results from those that were intended. Take the case of a manager who is being badgered to do better and better and surpass the output figure demanded of him by the latest plan. Somebody brings him a new idea and he is at once faced with an awkward—indeed a dangerous—decision. New ideas involve a risk, and if the invention is likely to slow down production for a time, the manager is naturally reluctant to accept it. The temptation is to put the blueprints in the files.

The manager has other worries. The bank may refuse to honor his checks if there is the slightest deviation from regulations that are narrowly defined and rigidly enforced. Then there is interference from his economic ministry. There is also the ever-watchful Party. While a manager relies on it to maintain the morale of his workers, he must at times be exasperated and thwarted when local, and even factory, officials give him orders.

Nor, is he, as one might suppose, free of labor troubles. Although there are restrictions, the law of supply and demand still operate to a certain extent. Managers over-spend the wages allotted to them or upgrade unskilled labor in order to prevent workers from drifting away to more attractive jobs. Thus although strikes are prohibited, it remains true that employees are by no means powerless. Indeed Mr. Nove makes a shrewd point about the Unions. "Their unrepresentative nature," he says, "has been noted by many, but the corollary to this is less obvious: it is that the Unions have little influence over the behavior of their members, who are well aware that the Union is not 'theirs'. Hence the recurrent reports that 'Socialist competition' obligations undertaken by the Unions on behalf of their members are formal in character and not acted upon by the workers."

There are other defects, the greatest being the lack of progress on the farms. Soviet agriculture in 1953 was "relatively further behind advanced Western countries than, say, 25 years ago"—a grim conclusion. Added to this must be put the appallingly low standard of housing in the towns and the lack of facilities in the retail trades.

Finally there is an imponderable that cannot be left out of account. Here, in conclusion, let me give a fairly lengthy passage in which Mr. Nove sums up a problem that may grow increasingly important as time goes on:

> We must now turn to another "slowing" factor: this is the increasing pressure for improved living standards. We see this in the great agricultural drive, which, whatever its chances of success, is certainly *intended* to raise the output of foodstuffs. The doubling of the rate of house building in the sixth five-year plan is also significant.
>
> It is immaterial for our present purpose whether the Soviet leaders do these things willingly or not. They may wish to give their people the most that can be spared, or the least that will persuade them to work; such fine distinctions can be left to philosophers. Social and economic pressures operate in the USSR, and only one totally blinded by the "totalitarian-state" generalization can deny it. Examples abound. For instance, efforts to persuade the peasants to produce more without adequate reward were repeatedly made, and as repeatedly failed; to get results, Khrushchev must put more money into peasant pockets, whether he likes to do this or not. It follows that more goods must be produced for the peasants to buy. House building becomes a necessity to stimulate industrial recruitment, to avoid excessive labor turnover. Overtime rates in the building industry had to be improved (with effect from January, 1956), not necessarily for love of building workers but because of serious shortages of these workers. The progress of education will certainly stimulate a demand for higher standards, and nowhere more than in the villages, where amenities are generally poor in the extreme.
>
> The Soviet government is thus being pushed all the time in the direction of devoting more resources to consumption, and many of its own higher officials must themselves be wishing for more security and comfort, less rush, fewer campaigns. Progress may at times be slow; in 1955, indeed, Khrushchev practically brought it to a halt, apparently with the object of eliminating bottle-necks in heavy industry. But pressures will accumulate and should have the gradual effect of reducing the disproportionate share of the national income devoted to growth-inducing sectors of the economy.

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*WILL THE USSR OUTDISTANCE THE US?*

# The Challenge to Our Economy

by TOM WHITNEY

THE post-Stalin regime has not altered in fundamentals the system of organization of the Soviet economy. It has not decentralized or desovietized industry, transport and trade. Though some moves have been made in the direction of giving the directors of enterprises in these fields greater freedom in working out arrangements with other enterprises they are still controlled very directly and very actively from Moscow. Likewise in agriculture, collective farms, state farms and machinery and tractor stations have not been dissolved. On the contrary they have been considerably strengthened. In their case also there has been a trend in the direction of giving enterprises somewhat greater autonomy—but firmly within the over-all Soviet framework of bureaucratic control from the center.

The post-Stalin regime has *not* moved away from the most basic Stalinist tenet of an overriding priority for the development of heavy industry. On the exact contrary it has emphasized that this line was and remains absolutely correct and beyond question. In the foreign economic field the post-Stalin regime has *not* shifted away from the Stalinist line of maximal integration of the developing economies of satellite countries with that of the Soviet Union. This integration moves ahead at just as rapid a pace as before.

The changes in economic policy which have been instituted by Stalin's heirs may be partly explicable by a different outlook on their part toward their relationship as leaders to the society they govern from that of Stalin. But these changes are in larger part comprehensible in terms of the radical growth in the last three decades in the degree of relative maturity of the economy of the Soviet Union.

If in 1928 the Soviet Union was a power inferior in its basic industry production not only to the United States but also to Britain, France and Germany, by 1955 it was producing very little less coal, steel and electric power than Britain, France and West Germany combined. This implies a vast change in the complexity of economic organization paralleled by changes in social relationships. If, for example, it was perhaps necessary in 1928 for Stalin's leadership to find a large part of the capital necessary for the pell-mell industrial buildup of the first five-year plans through ruthless exploitation of the peasantry, this policy was long since obsolete and harmful by 1955. Stalin, however, continued it and succeeded as a result in making agriculture the worst bottleneck in his economic system. When he left the scene his successors were forced for both political and economic reasons to review this policy and they found it wanting.

Therefore, without dissolving the collective and state farms, which they too found essential for control, they undertook to lighten substantially the taxation burden on the peasantry by reducing and regularizing compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce and by increasing very considerably the prices paid for both compulsory and voluntary deliveries of produce to state purchasing organizations. At the same time they attempted to create a better frame of mind on the part of the peasantry toward the state by reducing the coercion through taxation exercised against the small-scale private agricultural activity of the peasantry on their private land plots. Then in addition they proceeded to attempt to make up for Stalin's failure to invest sufficient capital in agriculture by allocating large funds for this purpose—all in such a way as to strengthen the Soviet socialist forms of organization of farming.

All these measures in net result amounted to an appreciable redistribution of national income in favor of the peasants. This was something which was long overdue.

IN the upshot the Soviet Union is at last on a path which in the long run may lead to an easing or even a solution of the problem of creating an agricultural abundance. And just as important for the regime, the peasantry is in all probability less of an element of discontent and dissatisfaction than it was three years ago. Because of the basic strength and capabilities of the Soviet economy the successors to Stalin found it possible to correct some of his rural mistakes without causing hardship to the non-farm population. In fact they have been able to undertake a change in policy in their favor as well.

The first move has been made in the reduction of the

TOM WHITNEY *is a Foreign Affairs Analyst and Staff Correspondent attached to the Foreign Desk of the Associated Press in New York. He was Chief of the Economic Section of the American Embassy in Moscow from 1944 to 1947 and a Staff Correspondent in the Associated Press Bureau in Moscow from 1947 to 1953.*

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long Soviet work week. It has now been reduced from 48 to 46 hours. A further reduction to 40 hours is promised for the near future. A new social security system providing pensions for the aged and disabled has been put into effect which will improve the social security particularly of the lower and middle group of wage and salary earners. The onerous law forbidding a worker or employee to leave his job without official permission has been repealed. And even though the Soviet housing system and shortage will still act more effectively than any rules and regulations to hold Soviet citizens to their jobs when they would like to make a change, this is nevertheless an important improvement.

More importantly, the government has found even with the continuing overriding priority for heavy industry over consumers' goods industry and trade, that it is still possible to increase the output of consumer goods and services each year to an appreciable extent.

Thus, summing up this point, in both agriculture and the non-farm economy the post-Stalin government has shifted the emphasis from the whip to the carrot, from compulsion to material and other incentives. One should not exaggerate this as an about-face in stress. Stalin also used material incentives. But it nevertheless constitutes a clear and obvious shift in policy. And the possibilities for it emerged not just from the death of Stalin but even more from the changed economic capabilities of the USSR.

THERE is another policy shift now apparently looming on the horizon which is in a much more infantile stage still—so much so that it is not possible yet to conclude definitely that it is actually taking place. This is the change in the direction of demilitarization of the economy.

The Soviet Government proclaimed last year a reduction in Soviet armed forces of 640,000 men. Whether this was actually carried out no one in the West knows. This year a further reduction of 1.2 million men has been announced. Again leaders and people in the West must look at this with a suspicious eye. But suspicion should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there are good economic reasons for believing that the Soviet Government may in fact have found it advisable to reduce the numbers of men serving in the armed forces by a substantial number.

It has long been obvious that the Soviet Union could, if its leaders did not intend it to be involved in a major war over a 10-year period, demobilize much of its army, and put most of its fleet and air force in mothballs without risking any danger at all of being attacked. The men who can be released from the armed forces are very badly needed in construction and the rest of the economy because of the general shortage of Soviet men resulting from direct and indirect (birth-rate decline) war losses greater than that of Saudi Arabia, and new electric power and Stalin's general prodigal wastage of human beings before and after the war. The funds going to armaments are also badly needed for capital investment.

It is perhaps a startling concept but a completely logical one for the Soviet Union to attempt at one and the same time to speed up its economic development at home and to force a general disarmament abroad by unilateral disarmament.

If this is what is actually taking place, then it must give a great deal of food for thought. And one of the things to think about is the fact that *the Soviet Union might be in a position to be a much stronger military power 10 to 15 years from now if that is its aim if it disarms to a considerable extent right now* and uses the resources freed from the military for its economic build-up.

SOVIET foreign economic policy has also seen changes in the past three years. The most important of these is in attitude toward the non-Communist world, particularly those sectors of it usually described as underdeveloped nations. It has embarked on a program of making available economic and technical assistance of various types to non-Communist countries, of offering and concluding important barter deals and credit agreements for supply of industrial and other equipment. This program is only in its initial stages but every day its ramifications grow.

Now the present Soviet leaders themselves have been the first to proclaim that the changes they have made in economic and political policy are directed not in the opposite direction from attainment of the ancient primary Communist aim—an all-Communist world or in other words world revolution—but toward a quicker attainment of that aim. Also unchanged is the more concrete Soviet economic goal—of overtaking the United States in basic industrial production at the earliest possible date. And this date, as various Soviet leaders have inferred, they now calculate will be within 10 to 15 years. To attain this goal the Soviet Government is implementing an economic plan which provides for an annual rate of increase in over-all industrial production of more than 10 percent per year. By 1960 the Kremlin plans to increase industrial output by 65 percent over 1955.

The Soviet economic plan is grandiose but real. Even making allowances for overestimation by the Soviet Government of Soviet capabilities in some fields such as agriculture, still it's an indubitable fact that between now and 1960 if the United States continues its development along the lines of recent years the Soviet Union will have very seriously reduced the American margin of economic superiority.

In just five years time the Soviet Union plans to add to its existing large steel output new steel production as large as that of West Germany, new coal output roughly equal to that of Britain, extensive new petroleum

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production equal to about three-quarters the combined 1955 output of Britain, France and West Germany last year. Relying on the immense growth potential of the Soviet economy and on the ability which Soviet totalitarian control of the economy gives to concentrate on a given objective, the Soviet Government intends to establish the Soviet Union firmly as the greatest industrial power of the earth not in the distant future but during the lifetimes of many of the present leaders of the country, though none of them are young men.

Now if this economic power which is being created so rapidly were intended to be used primarily and solely for the satisfaction of the very great material needs of the Soviet population and neighboring peoples it would not be a cause for concern to the outside world. In fact it would be something for which the Soviet Union deserved congratulation. But the Soviet leaders have repeatedly and loudly made clear for what purpose they are creating this power: creation of an all-Communist world. And if the United States permits the Soviet Union to succeed in becoming the first nation of the world in industry, economics and their handmaidens of science and technology it will take much more than mere H-bombs to prevent them from attaining this goal.

THE key to the situation is not the Soviet Union which has already set its course but the United States. It is only the United States which can force the Soviet leadership to turn its powerful economic machine away from the goal of world domination to the satisfaction of the material needs of its population. And this in the rather unstable political situation which exists in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death is not such a hard task as might be imagined. The United States after all could count on the support of the large sectors of the Soviet population who have no desire to chase the will-o'-the-wisp of world empire and want to enjoy material wealth now. These sectors can exercise an influence on Soviet policy and their unfulfilled aspirations can cause changes in leadership. But as things are today, despite the great opportunities that exist for the United States, the present Soviet leadership stands an excellent chance of succeeding.

To frustrate the Soviet aim of world domination the United States, leadership and people alike, must understand the problem and how to meet it. But there are no encouraging signs of such understanding. Blundering along aimlessly was not critical when the margin of economic superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union was ten to one. Now that it is nearer to two to one and the prospects are for loss of this superiority entirely in a space of 10 years, it *is* critical. The United States does not have nearly the time margin which most serious Americans seem to think it has. And the blame for the nation's complacency must lie in large part on the political leadership of the country which is failing the United States at its most crucial moment.

The ultimate curb in the recent past on Soviet military aggressiveness was never so much American military strength in being as American economic strength and technological expertness. The solution to the problem is therefore simple: to increase American economic strength so rapidly as to continually maintain a great margin of superiority over the Soviet Union.

The means for solution of the problem are also objectively simple—not in terms of American politics but in terms of what the nation must do in order to survive as an active force in the world.

The United States must assure itself of a regular annual rate of growth of gross industrial production on the order of 10 percent per year each year for at least the next ten years. This, to mention the obvious, is an enormous rate of growth for an economy so large as that of the United States. But it must be done. Only such a rate of American economic progress will assure that the economic balance of power will not be tipped in favor of the Russians any farther. Foreign aid programs are important but by themselves they mean nothing unless the American economy grows rapidly.

How can this be done? And can it be done without transforming the United States into another totalitarian country? I think it can, and I dare to venture a rough outline of *how* it can be done. It implies political daring and the junking of a number of American sacred cows, but not abandonment of private and free enterprise, destruction of political freedoms, or suffocation by taxation.

The American economy though it is growing and the nation is generally fairly prosperous is simply not growing fast enough. Experience furnishes the ready economic answer to how it can be made to grow faster. And this answer, of course, is by properly directed government spending. Call this "deficit finance" or any other name—it comes down to the same thing. The government must spend much more money than it takes in through taxation. I cannot say how much this spending



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has to amount to—$50 billion, $100 billion or $500 billion over the next 10 years. But I do know that X billion dollars spent by the government will assure a rise in industrial output of 10 percent per year or thereabouts and that in order not to permit the international scale to shift disastrously in favor of the Russians during the next decade we have to spend it.

Now, of course, it is important what this money is spent for. This is not a war and the money need not be invested in items to be blown up or sunk. It can be spent for things which Americans need and can use—roads, hospitals, schools, hydroelectric plants, atomic energy development, housing, the remaking of cities, the development of new areas of the country. There are plenty of useful objects which can be bought which will make the United States a richer country and an even better country to live in than it is already. Call it a "national investment" program and invest the money wisely in America's future. Certainly the national debt will rise rapidly. And why should it not if the increase represents actual concrete worthwhile objects of wealth and a nation assured of its security? What good will it be for America to have a balanced federal budget if we end up a second-rate industrial and political power?

Inflation? Such a program could probably be planned and executed in peacetime without significant inflation.

Higher taxes? A bigger economy, of course, means higher tax revenues without increases in tax rates. And those might well suffice.

THERE are other things as well which will assist a big economic upsurge besides government spending, though that is basic. Let's take as an example the question of immigration. At the present time the population of the United States is increasing around 2.8 million a year. (The Soviet population increase is running around 3.2 million annually.) This annual increase is one of the greatest built-in stimuli in the American economy for increased production. We can increase the stimulus by increasing the population rise. The easiest way to do this is by encouraging instead of discouraging immigration. This requires a change in the immigration laws. America with its 170 million culturally homogeneous people could absorb with benefit to the nation a million immigrants a year instead of the 200,000 or so taken in now. In addition such a rate of immigration would put us ahead of the Soviet Union by a distinct margin in net annual population increase and therefore in ultimate population.

Or let's take the question of our foreign trade policy. Once it had grown wealthy and influential in the 19th Century, England grew even wealthier and expanded her international economic influence even further by adopting free trade. The United States is in an ideal position to do the same. Every increase of one dollar in America's imports from abroad is likely to mean an increase of more than a dollar in America's exports to foreign lands. And with growth in foreign trade America's influence in those countries with which it trades will inevitably grow.



**The Russians claim that this hydroelectric plant along the Volga River will be, when completed this year, the largest in the world.**

The question of foreign trade leads, of course, directly to the question of foreign aid. How can we meet the Soviet foreign aid and trade "threat"? It seems to me that several observations are in order.

In the first place, we must face the fact that it is reasonable for the Soviet Union, now that it has become the second-ranking industrial power of the earth, to play a much larger role in the economic affairs of the non-Communist sector of the world than it has played up to now. Soviet aid to foreign countries outside the Communist orbit is not, it seems to me, bad in itself for us or for the countries which receive it.

If the Soviet Union builds a large steel plant for India which India needs and if the conditions of credit under which this aid is given India are such that India does not forfeit any part of its economic or political independence in accepting this aid, there is nothing, as I see it, which should alarm the United States in such a deal. In a general sense it is likely to be to America's benefit as well as that of India. The stronger and more stable India becomes as a non-Communist nation, the

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less likely it is that it will become Communist. And if the Russians can be induced to contribute to this end we should welcome it.

One has to distinguish carefully between different kinds of things which the Soviet Union does. In situations, for instance, where the Kremlin proposes to use the economic power of the Communist bloc to get itself into a decisive position in the economy of any non-Communist country, the United States must attempt to see to it that that country is offered a reasonable alternative which will enable it to maintain its economic and political independence. An example is the Soviet-Chinese surplus rice deal with Burma and the Soviet loan to Afghanistan. Some of these problems will be very difficult to handle; it is obvious that there must be a great deal of elasticity in the foreign economic activity of the US Government abroad and a great deal of discretionary authority of the executive arm of the government. Situations arise which will not wait till Congress meets and deliberates.

The President wants this year a foreign aid appropriation of about $5 billion. There is nothing particularly wrong about this sum. It is a very large amount of money. Spent well it probably could be sufficient for this particular activity. However, very little of this $5 billion, if it is actually appropriated, is intended for *economic* aid. The overwhelming bulk of it is supposed to go for *military* assistance to allies. In the present state of world affairs this military assistance for the most part, I believe, is not only useless but even positively harmful to the interests of the countries which would receive it and the United States itself.

There is no war crisis looming over the world. Most non-Communist nations should be reducing somewhat their military budgets rather than increasing them and simultaneously devoting more of their available funds to economic development which in the long run will make them better able to defend themselves. Some of the military materiel which the United States is giving to allies will be viewed by other non-Communist nations near them as a threat to their own security, perhaps justifiably. American gifts of military aid are virtually certain to earn America much ill-will and this will be increasingly true as events develop.

THE entire foreign aid program should be converted to a civilian economic aid program. It should be used to make available, on terms related to the particular needs and possibilities of recipient countries, *capital goods and technical assistance* which will be used to develop the human and natural resources of those countries.

There has been much talk of channelling it through the United Nations and its agencies. We have to look at such proposals very carefully indeed. It might well be useful to increase American economic aid through the UN to a considerable extent *and simultaneously to use American contributions through the UN in order to squeeze from the Soviet Union equal contributions given on a basis in which the Soviet Union will have no power whatsoever to use them for its political aims.* In other words we might well offer several hundred million dollars or even up to $1 billion through the UN on condition that the Soviet Union contribute in *hard cash*—gold or convertible currencies good for purchases *anywhere in the world,* not just in the Soviet Union—an equal amount. But as for putting any large part of the American foreign economic aid program under UN jurisdiction, that would be absurd. The United States must retain power over where and how its foreign aid funds are spent.

If the United States will view foreign economic aid spending *not* as a means of earning good will for the United States abroad which it never will, *not* as a means of binding old allies to ourselves or obtaining new ones for military-political alignments, *not* as bait for the attainment of temporary foreign policy objectives, *but as a means of assuring the most rapid possible growth of the economic might of non-Communist nations all over the world,* this spending can do much to contribute to the world's betterment and the United States' security.

LET'S take a concrete example. Country X is very friendly in its foreign policy to the United States. It votes regularly on the US side of UN questions. It is a member of one of the military-political groupings approved by the United States. But it is saddled with a semi-feudal and corrupt system of economics and politics. Money spent there will fall into the hands of thieving politicians. It has no scheme for developing the country, for providing education for its poverty-stricken millions, for taking the land out of the hands of landlords and putting it into the hands of the peasantry. Now, to be absolutely cynical about this, money spent in country X will only serve to postpone the day when this country will adjust itself to modern conditions and put its house in order. Only the smallest-scale *token* foreign aid should be given to country X until it starts to do this.

Country Y on the other hand pursues a highly independent foreign policy. It often votes against the United States in the UN. But it has set out to modernize its economy and social structure. It has an economic plan which provides a place for private enterprise as well as socialist state enterprise. It is attempting to educate its people. Its bureaucracy is sufficiently honest and responsible to refrain from wholesale theft of public moneys. It needs funds for capital development—to build dams and irrigation projects, a steel mill, a chemical works and a hundred other things. Country Y is not hostile to the United States. It is not threatening its neighbors.

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Country Y deserves American foreign economic aid—as much of it as it can absorb on conditions which are mutually acceptable to the United States and country Y. These conditions must not entail political strings, even though they may imply an open mind of country Y to suggestions from the United States on how it can further improve its economic system.

Not all foreign economic aid by any means needs to go to "underdeveloped" areas or countries. Some of it could well be spent in the more highly developed countries of the world. Further, foreign economic aid should not be spread all over the map. The recipient countries should be carefully selected as "strong points"—not for military alignments but of the world economy. As these "strong points" develop countries about them will sense the signs of the times and follow their example. And as a score of non-Communist nations like Turkey, India, Brazil and others grow of age economically more rapidly with such help, Soviet economic strength will seem much less impressive than it does now and in prospect.

These then are some of the implications for the United States, as I see them, of recent economic developments in the Soviet Union. Those which have import for the domestic economy of the United States are decisive, but those applying to American foreign economic policy are also highly important.

All of this, of course, goes far beyond economics. What the United States needs more than anything else is what one might call "purposefulness." People and political leaders alike need a vision of the future of the world and of America in that world expressed not only in the glittering generalities of "peace" and "freedom" and "democracy," though those are important too, but in more specific terms. This does not have to be a dogma or a steel-bound "ideology." But it has to give goals for which we work and towards which we strive—and against which we can judge the wisdom and correctness of contemporary policies.

***VARIATIONS ON A STALIN THEME***

# More Rewriting of History

**by ALEXANDER DALLIN**

THE CHANGES which the Soviet Union has experienced since Stalin's death can be gauged in three specific sectors of experience: law, education and historiography. Some changes have been concessions to pressure from below; others seem to have been initiated at the top; virtually all have amounted to a reaction against, and have brought some relief from, the rigor mortis stage of Stalinism.

In the field of law, a direct line leads from the amnesty of March 27, 1953, to the recent decrees abolishing the draconic provisions on "labor discipline." It reflects a revulsion against arbitrariness and abuse, a quest for rationalism and predictability.

Another set of legal changes stemmed from the reduction in authority of the secret police, in the wake of Beria's arrest. Characteristic of these were the abolition of the notorious Special Board of the MVD (September, 1953); and the delegation to the Prosecutor General's Office of some supervisory authority over the secret police (April, 1956). Simultaneously, the forced labor camps have undergone a far-reaching depopulation and improvement of conditions. The criminal code is being revised, and several areas of complaint are apparently slated for improvement: conviction "by analogy" is to cease; the role of the defense counsel is to increase; and pre-trial investigation procedures are to be regularized somewhat.

Most dramatic of all, perhaps, is the current attack not only on Beria and the secret police (including in good Stalinist fashion, the purge of the purgers) but also—since the 20th Communist Party Congress—the denunciation of conviction by the defendant's own confession of guilt, as practiced particularly in the Great Purges of the late 'thirties. A practical aspect of these

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ALEXANDER DALLIN *served as Associate Director of the Research Program on the USSR, a project sponsored by the Ford Foundation, and will join the faculty of Columbia University next year as Assistant Professor of International Relations. His book on the German occupation of the Soviet Union in World War II will appear this fall.*

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reversals has been the "rehabilitation" of many who had been formerly branded as "enemies of the people" by the very men who today proclaim them to be guiltless. Most often, it is true, it is too late to right the miscarriage of justice: the victims are dead.

There can be no doubt that the changes in Soviet legal practice go a long way toward reassuring broad strata of Soviet society. So far as the individual citizen is concerned, the atmosphere of terror has seemingly been dispelled. At the same time, the government's monopoly of power and control remains untouched. There is not the slightest suggestion that any law could bind the regime. There are no checks, no balances, no verification and ventilation by publicity. Secret laws and secret police remain. The "collective leadership" is still the unchallenged master of the law which it may—and does—change at will.

SOVIET education illustrates how little the fundamentals of the Communist outlook have changed: indoctrination as a universal and imperative goal, and the State's complete control of the training system, remain unquestioned. The changes wrought in the past 40 months have aimed at streamlining the machine and at removing sources of widespread grievance.

Thus, the re-introduction of co-education in 1955 flowed from a factual review of the situation and is without deeper political implications. The current insistence on greater polytechnical education in secondary schools is neither novel (it was repeatedly demanded before Stalin's death) nor politically motivated—except insofar as it reflects a continued pressure for preparing the growing industrial cadres for their future tasks. Likewise, efforts to eliminate duplication of materials presented in different school courses, and to reduce somewhat the burden of school work, stem from a rational, technical reassessment made possible by the greater flexibility evinced in Soviet conduct since Stalin's death. At the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev announced the abolition of tuition fees for upper grades and higher education. The practical significance of the move is likely to be slight, but for propaganda purposes, it is doubtlessly rewarding.*

However strong, and frequently the new clichés in-



Two fourth-year students of the mechanics and mathemat faculty at Moscow University.

veigh against "dogmatism" in favor of a "creative approach," the basic theory and view of education remain unaltered. As the official *Herald of Higher Education* puts it, the schools "must intensify their propaganda of the decisions of the Party and Government"; they must promote Soviet patriotism and "show the leading role of the Party in the history of the Soviet state and the building of Communism." Komsomol and Party cells in the schools are being strengthened, and teachers and scientists daring to question the fundamentals of the system are quickly being slapped down as "rotten elements."

The Communist leadership has always looked upon history as a tool. While now and then first-rate historical works are being produced, history under the Soviets has been increasingly reduced to an ancillary instrument of propaganda. Not only must the official version accord with the universal categories of Marxian historical determinism: events and theories must also conform to the "line" laid down by the Party. And with each zigzag of tactics, the past is reassessed and reinterpreted in harmony with political dictates—or forever flushed down the Orwellian memory hole.

Each major turn in Soviet politics has brought about a change in historical interpretation. The end of Stalinism has been no exception, but this time the reversals appear to have gone a little further. In part, they have been a product of the general climate of greater fluidity, with its inevitable appeal to the professionals—a spirit well characterized by a recent Soviet editorial calling for "more breadth, elasticity, daring." In part, the new line has been the concomitant of political change: the new leadership is as eager as was the old one to bolster its

* Most perplexing, alongside this array of "popularization" moves (and the reduction of teachers' and scientists' salaries bears in the same direction), is another innovation announced by Khrushchev. Though denying their "aristocratic élite" character, he called for the establishment of exclusive boarding schools—"in picturesque suburban localities, in healthy wooden tracts"—where exceptional, picked children would be given superior instruction, for which "funds and efforts should not be stinted." Whether this is a crackpot notion of the new leadership, a serious effort at specialized training, or a concession to the new privileged stratum seeking to insure the inheritance of status by their children, remains to be seen. It certainly reflects the need to overcome, for at least a small group, the low standards of average urban schooling.

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own status by rewriting the past, finding new heroes, and producing new scapegoats.

The most obvious phase of "Operation Rewrite" has been the removal of Lavrenti Beria from the Bolshevik pantheon, highlighted by the "suggestion" of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* "carefully to cut out" the pages referring to the late and unlamented police chief, and to substitute in their place a picture of the Bering Strait. Somewhat later, Beria's *On the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*—a clumsy effort to inflate Stalin's past performance, and replete with falsehoods and forgeries—was likewise quietly taken out of circulation.

There has been a drastic downgrading, not only of Stalin himself, but more broadly of the role of the individual in history—always a bone of contention for Bolshevik historians who seek to crowd into their arsenal of musts both the inevitability of historical laws and the contribution of the Leader's own unrivaled genius. The upshot has been a rash of politically inspired, dull but insistent articles on the crucial role of the "popular masses" in history, as the inevitable, timely, but empty counterpart to the current drive against the "cult of the individual." Lenin, it is true, is not being made a victim of this campaign. On the contrary, the historians—guided by the politicians' search for a pre-Stalinist legitimacy—extoll Lenin and his associates (the surrogate prototype of an earlier "collective leadership"), prepare new editions of their writings, unearth surviving "old Bolsheviks," and comment on their memoirs with an all too obvious eagerness.

So far as historical research, properly speaking, is concerned, it has taken some time for the new era to leave its mark. While Stalin himself dropped out of sight (the once mandatory footnotes to his writings diminished in frequency, and the last three volumes of his *Collected Works* never appeared), the spirit of Stalinism remained pervasive. Thus 1954 and 1955 were years of transition; the anti-Western line was still strong; historians militantly denied foreign influences on ancient Kiev and hotly assailed American imperialism.

At the same time, contemporary and oriental studies were revived with considerable vigor. Individual articles now demanded that MVD archives be thrown open to historical research. And, after many earlier futile tries, at last a number of men ventured onto the treacherous ice of "writing the history of the Soviet era." The years of terror, in which many a scholar had sought escape and safety in the study of antiquity or the publication of sources and documents, seemed to be over. And after enforced intellectual isolationism, some contacts with the West resumed. Soviet historians participated in international gatherings, joined the UNESCO project on the history of science and culture, and delivered themselves of a spate of (mostly mediocre) papers at the International Congress of Historical Science in Rome in September, 1955.

The current year has brought the new trend to some sort of climax. Clearly with official sanction, the Soviet historical journal suggested, even prior to the February 20th Party Congress, that the anti-American spirit had gone too far when Benjamin Franklin was depicted as a "troubadour" of American middle-class dreams of world conquest. (Typically, this rebuke brought forth three articles in praise of Franklin.) At the same time, it hinted that it was carrying the eradication of the "individual" in history too far when Robespierre and Voltaire were purged from texts on 18th Century France.

In Bolshevik history, one form of historical revisionism—no doubt, carefully co-ordinated with the Central Committee—has been the rehabilitation of such Communist leaders as Kosior, Chubar, Rudzutak and Bubnov, and of such military men as Marshals Gamarnik, Blücher and Egorov, who had disappeared or committed suicide in the Great Purges. (It is noteworthy, however, that none of those convicted by formal trial was rehabilitated.) Soon the posthumous revival spread to include satellite figures, such as Bela Kun, the Hungarian Communist liquidated in 1937, and the Polish Communist leaders who had been excommunicated as police agents in 1938. Above all, the return to grace of Marshal Tito provoked a flood of articles on modern Yugoslavia.

Some historical re-evaluations were of less obvious timeliness or political purpose. M. N. Pokrovsky, once the undisputed boss of the Soviet "historical front" until his posthumous purge by Stalin (among other things, for denying the role of the individual and the unique qualities of the Russian people), suddenly re-emerged, if not in the good graces, at least as a name one could mention without pejorative adjectives. He was now described as a historian who had taken extreme and erroneous positions (which he had) but who had done valuable work (which he also had). Likewise, non-Communist Russian historians, including Paul Vinogradoff,

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D. M. Petrushevsky, and even a *bête noire* like Paul Miliukov, were belatedly proclaimed reputable.

The departure from Stalinism permitted the abandonment of "anti-cosmopolitanism" in history. No longer was it obligatory to condemn as alien all favorable references to the West and ascribe all discoveries and inventions to Russians. Where previously no foreign historians could be cited, let alone revered, now even Ranke and Croce, Lefèvre and Labrousse became *salonfahig*. Recent Soviet books are being attacked for ignoring the influence of foreign thought on Russia, *e.g.*, the impact of Herder and Hegel. Nor is it any longer essential—as it was during the last years of Stalin—to play down the negative aspects of tsarist imperialism and annexations; and the so-called "theory of the lesser evil" (according to which the Russian conquest of non-Russian nationalities was "objectively a progressive development" preferable to any other course) is rapidly going out the window.

For many years, Shamil, the mid-19th Century North Caucasian independence fighter, was a Communist idol because of his struggle against tsarism. After World War II, he fell victim to the Zhdanovite zealots, who condemned him as a reactionary. As recently as November, 1953, a volume published in Tiflis "proved" that Shamil had been a "puppet of Pan-Islamic Turkey and the English colonialists." Now the question has been officially "reopened," with Beria and Bagirov (another Caucasian Communist leader purged in 1953) being blamed for the tarnishing of Shamil's reputation.

In return, Moscow now accuses Soviet historians of having applied the cult of the individual to such figures as Ivan the Terrible—whose image, under Stalin, had undergone a complete transformation from utter rejection to an encomium suggestive of parallels to the late dictator. Marshal Suvorov, much eulogized in recent Soviet historiography, is being "cut down to size" because he fought against the French Revolution and helped suppress the Pugachov rebellion.

CLEARLY, some historians (like some scientists, writers and artists) have taken advantage of the present thaw to publicize views that were taboo for years. A number of writers long silenced reappear on the pages of Russian journals. Provided they do not touch on the fundamental premises of Communism, some modest but genuine differences of historical interpretation are now being debated in print. The key note of this liberal drive was sounded by a historian in an appeal "to distinguish between honest error and malicious falsification, between mistaken views and outright untruth." In a narrowly circumscribed sphere, these men seem at last to have won the right to make a mistake without thereby automatically becoming "enemies of the people." Indeed, even the major purge victims like Bukharin and Rykov, while being violently condemned, are increasingly portrayed as sincere misguided opponents rather than as foreign agents. Anastas Mikoyan sounded the keynote to this change when he told the 20th Party Congress that crises in Soviet life must no longer be ascribed to "allegedly subversive activities of some former Party leaders who, many years after the events, were wrongly declared enemies of the people."

Important as these changes are, their limits must not be ignored. While the given "line" changes, some "line" always remains—and this in itself constitutes a telling indictment of Soviet historiography. Indeed, the present reversal sounds in many respects like a parody, standing Stalinist history on its head. Likewise, the continued pressure for theoretical, doctrinal justification at every turn, and the need for reference to higher political authority in footnotes and formulations (at present, predominantly to Lenin) betray the extent to which the historian is either kept or cowed.

THE leading journal, *Voprosy Istorii* [Problems of History], has in effect the status of legislator in matters historical (something which, very mutely, some men have recently dared to attack). Its editors, Pankratova and Burdzhalov, are trusted and high-ranking Party hacks rather than *bona-fide* scholars. The same Pankratova (a member of the Party's Central Committee) who now poses as a historiographic Joan of Arc, praised Stalin a few years ago as the creator of Soviet historical science who "extended the limits of Soviet history by 1,500 to 2,000 years." She led the vicious campaign against Pokrovsky and later joined in the well-staged anti-cosmopolitan chorus. No doubt, she would switch again if the Party were to demand it.

The whole change is taking place almost surreptitiously, shamefacedly, with the participants uncertain of how far they may push and some key historians keeping a studied silence. The revisions are proceeding piecemeal and eclectically, without any unifying pattern—except to seek relief from prior rigidity and to experiment in controlled spontaneity.

Some taboos remain. There are the untouchables like Trotsky, who are not subject to review. Current dissertation topics reveal no marked departure from the customary sterility and conformity. The latest directives confirm that none but Bolshevik versions may be published—not even documents of other revolutionary parties concerning the 1905 or 1917 Revolutions. Moreover, while there are good and competent historians at work, their bows of fealty to the powers-that-be are bound to have an effect on competence, method, and performance (much more so than for the natural sciences and technology). Used to conventional mouthings, even the most promising among the younger men may need years to assimilate the best of academic ethics and unfamiliar ideas. And who is there who can and dares teach these to them? Yet there are

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germs of hope, it seems to me, in the quest for greater truth and more elbow-room. It is comforting to learn that, throughout the roughest years, some men kept their standards and integrity, and that there was ample pressure accumulated that burst to the surface as soon as the lid was ever so slightly lifted. Recent reports by first-hand observers speak of widespread intellectual ferment and questioning of axioms. Students have been jolted out of their comfortable cynicism-*cum*-cliché existence. Even within a totalitarian dispensation, the iron logic of liberalization imposes on the leadership a crucial dilemma. The political masters have permitted the professional intellectual to whet his appetite, which will henceforth grow *en mangeant*. Will they be willing to permit further questioning of facts and assumptions? Can they stop it without reverting to the terror they profess to undo? And, once the process is off the dead point, will they be able to control the emboldened inquisitive mind?

***OUTLOOK FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS***

# Repercussions in China

**by BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ**

ANY JUDGMENT concerning the impact of the post-Stalin changes in the Soviet Union on Communist China naturally involves a prior judgment concerning the significance of these changes themselves. It involves a judgment on the Soviet situation, on the current Chinese Communist situation and on the possible relations between the two. It is somewhat doubtful whether anyone should ever attempt a judgment on a question involving such a plethora of unknown variables but having taken the plunge, I shall proceed to speculate without further self-justification.

The general line of policy in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death strikes this reader as a sort of calculated experiment on the part of the present dominant group in the Kremlin. The problem involved—on the side of internal affairs—is: How far can we proceed to reduce terror, arbitrariness and the more obvious forms of interference in daily life without losing control of any of the levers of power in any sector of Soviet life, without impairing the façade of monolithic unity or undermining the elements of ideology which still seem to us to be vital? Quite apart from any supposed "pressures from below," there may be factors involved in the relationships of the top leading group itself which may have led it to desire certain changes of this type. The experiment is still in its early stages and there seems to be a considerable degree of uncertainty on the part of the leadership itself. It is quite possible that if they proceed much further along those lines, it may lead to a real challenge to their power in this or that sector as well as to their over-all ideological authority. They are probably still in a position to reverse their policies to meet such a challenge. On the other hand, one cannot dogmatically assert that changes of this type may not possibly affect the basic structure of power. They are changes which *might* become fundamental.

The counterpart of this internal policy in the realm of foreign affairs has been a willingness to pay a considerable price in terms of immediate organizational and ideological control in order to retain the allegiance of Communist China and, if possible, lure back Yugoslavia to the fold. In the realm of relations with the non-Communist world, it has meant a relaxation of the effort to attain immediate positions of power in order to obtain a maximum of a diffused sort of influence throughout the world. Here the calculation may well be that the "good will" approach, creation of a favorable image of the Soviet Union, may create a milieu favorable to future Communist Party activities.

Now many aspects of the post-Stalin development in the Soviet Union are undoubtedly highly welcome to the Chinese Communists. The basic approach of the new Soviet leadership in the realm of Sino-Soviet relations has been one of removing obvious annoyances to the national pride of the Chinese and of showing a certain degree of respect for their ideological pretensions. Stalin's persistent claim that he was the architect of the Chinese Communist victory has been brushed aside. Mao Tse-tung's works have been translated into Russian and extensively reviewed. Finally, there is reason to believe that the various statements made at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU concerning the variety of paths to socialism were directed, in part, to the Chinese Communists. The Chinese have been insisting for some time that their "path to socialism" is "peculiar" and the

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BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ *is Assistant Professor of History and Government at Harvard University. He has had published* Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao *and also collaborated with Conrad Brandt and John Fairbank on* A Documentary History of Chinese Communism.

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Resolutions of the Twentieth Congress single out China as a living example of another path to socialism. Furthermore, gestures such as the liquidation of joint stock companies and the relinquishment of railway rights on Manchuria remove certain obvious sources of embarrassment for the Chinese Communist leaders.

This does not mean that all possible tensions between the two states have necessarily disappeared. To the extent that the Chinese Communists must look to the Soviet Union as the source of capital, they find themselves in a state of economic dependency. Furthermore, the renewed public-relations campaign of the Soviets in Asia and Africa may conflict somewhat with the Chinese Communist leaders' image of themselves as the Communist apostles to the non-Western world. Nevertheless, certain formidable irritants have either been removed or sharply reduced. Since the Chinese Communists have no desire to leave the "socialist camp" so long as their own conception of their position and role in that camp is acknowledged by the Kremlin, the alliance is probably not immediately endangered. The price that Moscow is paying is the constant reconfirmation of China's organizational and ideological autonomy.

However, the question that we are here considering involves much more than the external relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union. Internal changes within the Soviet Union must necessarily lead to some sort of reaction—either negative or positive—in terms of the internal development of Communist China. Communist China still looks to the Soviet Union as providing the model of "socialism" whatever may be its claims concerning Chinese peculiarities.

HERE, too, the Chinese Communists can meet some of the Soviet developments with a certain degree of equanimity. To cite one example—Stalin has been attacked for his arbitrary purges of high government and party personnel. Now while the Chinese Communists have made ample use of sanguinary terror in their general social policies; while they have even added refinements and innovations of their own in the realm of what is known as brainwashing, the fact remains that since Mao Tse-tung's rise to party leadership in the middle thirties *intra-party* conflicts have been far less marked by sanguinary purges than has been the case in the Soviet Union. We shall not attempt to provide the reasons for this difference but the difference is a real one and thus lends color to a statement made in a document issued at the beginning of April by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ("On Historical Experience Concerning Dictatorship of the Proletariat") which implies that, unlike Stalin, Mao has not placed himself "over and above the party."

There are ways in which the Chinese Communists may actually derive certain advantages from the current attack on Stalin. In the document mentioned above it is hinted

Red China's Mao Tse-Tung

for the first time that Stalin himself may have borne the ultimate responsibility for certain "errors" of Chinese Communist history in the face of the correct policies of the present Chinese Communist leadership. While they have long maintained that the "general truths of Marxism-Leninism" must be united with "the concrete situation in China," they are now able to assert without equivocation that it was the Chinese Communist leadership which alone understands how to combine these two factors. It is also interesting to note that the document in question makes a special point of criticizing Stalin's erroneous line on the Yugslavian question. In brief, then, the Chinese Communists have been able to use the current denigration of Stalin to enhance their own historic position and to underline the organizational and ideological autonomy of the CCP.

In spite of these advantages, however, the document is marked by a certain pervasive uneasiness and extreme caution. A great deal of attention is devoted to refuting any derision which may arise in the camp of the "reactionaries." While Stalin is denigrated, his positive accomplishments are given a somewhat larger emphasis than is the case in current Soviet pronouncements.

While the nature of Mao's leadership may actually have been somewhat different from Stalin's, the fact remains that many of the techniques used to glorify Stalin have also been appropriated by the Chinese. Mao is presented as one of the great philosopher-kings in the Lenin-Stalin tradition. Mao seems to possess sufficient flexibility to dispense with some of the more obvious Stalinist techniques of self-glorification, but the mere suggestion that one of the three great philosopher-kings

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—a man who was regarded for years as the very incarnation of party infallibility—was guilty of "subjectivism" and gross errors inevitably reduces the whole image of the Communist philosopher-king in general. Is it not conceivable that Mao may also have been "subjective" at times?

What is more important, Communist China now finds itself in a very "Stalinist" period of its development. Totalitarianism control over the society has just been achieved and all energies are now being harnessed for the realization of a Stalinist program of economic development. There are to be more differences—both real and verbal—in China's path of development but the general tendency at the moment is to hold the totalitarian line firmly in all sectors. Even now, a strenuous campaign is still being conducted against all sorts of "erroneous" tendencies in philosophy and literature. It is doubtful whether a loosening of control in any area is, at present, considered desirable.

So long as the Soviet development remains in its present experimental stage; so long as it is confined to measures to reduce terror and arbitrariness in the administrative sphere and to the encouragement of a sort of general relaxation in the spiritual sphere without any actual relinquishment of ideological control, the Chinese Communists can probably insulate their society against any immediate untoward effects. The interpretation of Soviet developments is, of course, the exclusive prerogative of the Chinese Communist leadership.

In sum, then, while the whole post-Stalin development may be welcome to the Chinese Communist leadership insofar as it has led to a more satisfactory pattern of Sino-Soviet relations, and while the denigration of Stalin involves advantages as well as disadvantages, one cannot help but feel that the new Soviet developments may also be occasioning certain anxieties in Peking. If the concept of Party infallibility declines, if the façade of monolithic unity in the Soviet Union is cracked, if what remains of the common ideology is still further corroded, this is bound to affect the Chinese movement. The Chinese Communists must themselves be deeply concerned with the outcome of the Soviet experiment.

***THE RESPONSE OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN***

# New Approach to South Asia

**by SELIG S. HARRISON**

IN THE infinite life of the Hindu God Brahma, a standard mythological "day" lasts 4.32 billion years. The 20th Century falls in the 51st year of the present Brahma life cycle. Brahma's lifetime will end, amid a universal dissolution, after a century of Brahma days and nights—only to begin all over again in a new cycle of 311.04 billion years.

Hindu notions of limitless space and time defy the West's Creation and Doomsday, its epochs and epoch-making events. Momentous as a generation may be, it is only a fleeting speck in this cosmic perspective. "It is true that the Soviet challenge seems quite enormous in 1953," said India's philosopher-statesman Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, then Ambassador in Moscow,

> but you Americans make too much fuss about it. In 20 years they will have some of your system, you will have some of theirs, and you will both wonder what you were so excited about. There will be new power relationships, arising from the fact of the new East—which is far bigger than Communism.

Now vice president of the Indian Union, Radhakrishnan had just returned to New Delhi after his last interview with Stalin. He recalled having asked him

> why they do not dissolve the Cominform, or at least stop characterizing India as an imperialist dependency. Stalin laughed and said they would certainly do that in time; why didn't the Americans stop building bases? Did we Indians really think the Soviets were black in a black-and-white world? I very nearly said that he and his dictatorship did look black to us, and that if we didn't let that upset us, it was because we knew dictators cannot go on forever.

Long before 1953 this was routine talk in New Delhi. Even in Stalin's heyday, Indian leaders were looking deliberately to the day when Stalin would be no more. No intellectual somersaults were necessary to adjust to the new leadership or the new line. It was in logical sequence for Radhakrishnan to say, in April,

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SELIG S. HARRISON *accompanied Walter Reuther on his recent trip to India. From 1951 to 1954 he was Associated Press correspondent in New Delhi.*

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956, that the Twentieth Party Congress presents

> the opportunity to adopt an attitude of tolerance and accept the new Soviet attitude as a significant one, working on that basis. It would be unreasonable to think that the Soviet Union is still aiming at world domination by Communism through methods of violence. If we persist in a policy of distrust, we shall be held responsible for the continuation of the Cold War.

This is not the logic of blind faith. Be distrustful, reserve your judgment, Radhakrishnan would counsel; but do not persist in a *policy* based on distrust. Not only in Radhakrishnan's warning—"we" shall be held responsible—but in all Indian policy toward the Communist world, the unspoken object is to place the onus on the other side for any deterioration in relations. Thus, by giving the benefit of the doubt to Peking and Moscow, India can induce them to put their signatures to Prime Minister Nehru's "Panch Shila" or Five-Point mutual respect pact—pledging good behavior.

INDIAN response to the changes in the Soviet Union has blended the nonchalance of the one who knew it all along with a scrutiny directed anxiously at particulars. When Stalin was downgraded, the pro-government *Hindustan Times* skipped over general implications to warn that the attacks on his war record suggested "a bid by the professional soldiers, already well entrenched in the Soviet hierarchy, to move farther up in the 'collective leadership'." Dissolution of the Cominform struck the Indians as a gesture directed specifically their way, since Nehru had publicly urged this step after his 1955 Soviet visit. Calcutta's *Amrita Bazar Patrika* called this "an impressive indication of the welcome change that has come over the Kremlin."

Even more welcome, *Pravda* chose India's Republic Day, January 26, for its historic 1955 editorial repudiating the seven years of attacks on Nehru's "imperialist" government to which Radhakrishnan had objected. Until then a pawn of Anglo-American monopoly, India became "a progressive, independent republic, carrying on many impressive programs of economic development." "Reactionary" Gandhi reappeared in the Soviet encyclopedia as "a great leader whose name is surrounded with an aura in his homeland."

Of all the post-Stalin reversals in South Asia policy, the most telling has been the new Soviet appeal to Indian nationalism—what Dag Hammarskjold aptly calls "the Big India dream." Until Republic Day, 1955, the Soviet literature on India had emphasized the separate national rights of 14 distinct linguistic territories within India, and Indian Communism's accent on separatism challenged the very idea of the new Indian Union. Now the Soviets not only soft-pedal separatism, seeking to restrain Indian Communist attacks on Nehru's national unity program, but they make a straightforward appeal to Hindu nationalist pride.

In his speech last December in Kashmir, Khrushchev salved Hindu sores left by the 1947 Indian Partition under which Moslem-majority areas became the separate nation of Pakistan. To many Hindus, Partition was nothing more than the surrender to upstart Moslems of part of the Big India envisioned in the ancient Hindu scriptures. "We are absolutely convinced that when passions have calmed down and people realize the significance of such an artificial division of India, they will regret it," Khrushchev declared. This was couched so as to support the secular principle (Hindus and Moslems can live together) which underlies Nehru's claim on Moslem Kashmir. At the same time it implanted a Soviet shaft in the hard orthodox hearts of the Hindu politicians who had dreamed of hegemony over the entire subcontinent—the Moslem minority of 100 million included.

While scoring his point with the Indians, Khrushchev was mindful of the implications of his line in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union since Stalin has keyed its tactics in South Asia to the political realities of the region taken as a whole. By signing a military assistance pact with Pakistan in the name of collective security, the United States flies in the face of Indian nationalist sentiment. Khrushchev's charge that "imperialist powers" shattered the Big India dream in 1947, fomenting Partition, carries forward to the present. In effect he asks: Is not the US even now consolidating the division? Yet his clearly implied challenge to Pakistan's national existence does not trade a gain in one country for a loss in another.

Pakistan cannot exact from the United States the unequivocal stand on Kashmir that the Soviet Union, with its direct security interests in the adjacent Himalayan state, can afford to lavish on India. Within Pakistan the Soviets can thus evoke understandable doubts about the wisdom of the commitment to the West.

TO a great extent these doubts were latent from the start. Indian and Pakistani intellectuals share similar images of the Soviet Union and the United States, differing only in their view of each other; Pakistan conceived its military pact with the United States primarily in terms of its power relationship with India. But Pakistan is now beset with churning new debate that has brought these doubts abruptly to the surface. As a result, the government must sooner or later improve its relations with the Soviet Union and China.

The US-Pakistan pact gives the Soviet Union a pretext for its growing penetration in Afghanistan, Pakistan's northern neighbor and rival. The $100 million Soviet economic-assistance program in Afghanistan wields influence entirely out of proportion to the sum. Moreover, the Soviets have identified themselves with the Afghan claim to the Pakhtoon tribal areas on Pakis-

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

Nehru welcomes Bulganin and Khrushchev to India

tan's Himalayan frontier. With a few trivial words in Kabul about Soviet dedication to the principle of national self-determination and the right of the Pakhtoons to invoke this principle Khrushchev sent thundering political reverberations into Pakistan. Pakhtoon territory lies along Pakistan's strategic northwest border, and Karachi wonders whether the Soviets should not be given a price to keep their distance.

While such cold considerations of *realpolitik* govern the Pakistani attitude toward the Soviets, in the case of China a Pan-Asian emotional fillip heightens the pressure for a new relationship. Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza, President of Pakistan, has taken pains to discount the implications of the state visit to Peking which Prime Minister Chaudri Mohammed Ali had scheduled for June and then postponed at the last moment. Yet in the same statement in which he assured the West that Pakistan was not going neutralist, General Mirza urged that the United States should recognize Communist China. Discussing the China tour, Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, Mohammed Ali, distinguishes between the Soviet Union and China in much the same way that Nehru does (though he dissociates his motives from the fear which he attributes to Nehru). Like Nehru, he stresses China's Asian points of difference with the Soviets, assuring the West that the two can be separated. General Mirza and Mohammed Ali differ from Nehru first, by saying publicly what Nehru says privately, and second, by coupling whatever they say with references to their free world ties.

The Soviets and Chinese alike tempt Pakistan with offers of economic co-operation even as they attack the very concept of Pakistan and abet disaffection among the Pakhtoons. Soviet Premier Bulganin sent out a feeler in February for the sale of badly needed industrial machinery in exchange for jute, a drag on a falling world market. When famine struck East Pakistan in May, the Soviets were quick to offer 40,000 tons of foodgrains relief. But however they respond to Moscow and Peking, the discomfited leaders of Pakistan must explain their behavior to Washington. Thus, Ambassador Mohammed Ali maintains that Pakistan's past barter deals with Communist governments (cotton for coal and foodgrains) and even Bulganin's Februa gesture differs qualitatively from India's developing lin of credit with the Soviet Union. "With us it is quite a different matter from the basis of easy credit which India is accepting. We do not become obligated in any sense."

Certainly India would discount the suggestion that to accept easy credit as such is to give up a measure of independence. But there is no getting away from the fact that the extent and the rate of present Soviet economic penetration in India can, if kept up over a period of years, orient India's emerging government-operated heavy industry in the direction of the Soviet Union. The present Indian leadership fears that the reluctance of the West to assist substantially in India's economic development may lead precisely to this result. US military aid to Pakistan and such irritants as the Dulles statement on Goa have created an emotional receptivity to Soviet gestures radically different from that only three years ago.

To date the Indian Government has signed agreements with the Soviet Union providing for the construction of a million-ton steel mill and the import o one million tons of finished steel as well as substantia oil and mining equipment. These are on a basis c 12-year, 2.5-percent loans. The Soviets also place em phasis in such sensitive smaller fields as the developmen of Linotypes adapted to scripts in India's regional lan guages. Under a recent Indo-Soviet shipping pact, six Indian and six Soviet ships will ply between Bombay and Odessa. Informed estimates point to an over-al Soviet line of credit in New Delhi of at least $400 million by 1959.

Even this does not yet represent more than a tent tive Soviet economic commitment in India, and it m be that the Soviets are no more prepared to divert larg scale capital to India than is the West. But can t West base its policy on such a colossal maybe?

THE Soviet economic drive in India comes at the v moment when India embarks on a Second Five-Y Plan with a built-in deficit of at least $800 millio This deficit could mount to nearly half the entire pr ected outlay of the Plan if desired internal and fore revenues do not materialize. Political necessity has for India's planners to set their sights higher on paper th actual anticipated resources justify. Moreover, so insi ent are rising popular expectations of economic prog ress that Western failure to give needed support to India's economic development can result only in the erosion of representative institutions. Even if the Soviets should fail to capitalize on such a Western failure with economic aid of their own, the compulsion to achieve rapid progress may well lead inexorably to a totalitarian imitation of the Soviet model by India's own choice.

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NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

# The Soviets and Neutralism

by LUCIAN W. PYE

FROM THE TIME Lenin developed his theories of "imperialism," Communist doctrine has stressed the revolutionary potential of what it refers to as the "colonial and semi-colonial" areas of the world. On the basis of this emphasis in doctrine, it would seem that the history of Communist activities should reflect a special interest in Southeast Asia, an economically underdeveloped region with a long record of colonial rule. In actual practice, however, the decisions of Moscow have rarely been particularly helpful in advancing the revolutionary efforts of the Communist Parties in Southeast Asia.

Before World War II, local Communists were called upon to follow programs with little regard to developments among the emerging nationalist groups. Although always ready to exploit any popular discontent, the Communists steadfastly sought to maintain themselves as a distinct political movement, not to be confused with other groups who might also be opposing colonial rule. At the beginning of the European war, with the Japanese threat hanging over the region, the Communists were conspicuous in their opposition to the Allied cause. Then, after the German attack on Russia the Communists swung to the opposite extreme, co-operating more closely, at least on the surface, with the Western Allies than most of the Nationalist elements were prepared to do. The decision in 1948 that all parties in the region resort to "armed struggle" again put the Communists out of step with the dominant mood of the peoples of Southeast Asia. In Burma the Communists were called upon to attack a government which had just gained its independence, and in Indonesia the Communists turned upon a government which was on the verge of ending 200 years of Dutch rule.

In the fall of 1952, it appeared for the first time that the Soviet Union was about to adopt a policy which might prove advantageous to the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. At the 19th Party Congress Stalin unexpectedly re-emphasized Lenin's theories of "imperialism." In doing so Stalin held out the prospect for the Communists that the Western Alliance would soon be beset with internal difficulties arising out of the "inevitable weakening of the capitalistic system," and that in the future the underdeveloped countries would sever their relations with the West and seek their destinies with the Soviet Union. After Stalin's death, and especially since the decisions announced at the 20th Party Congress, the Soviets have intensified this campaign.

With the invitations to Southeast Asian leaders to visit Russia and China have come extensive aid as well as trade proposals. An indication of the importance the Soviets attach to their new approach is the speed with which they have made deliveries on their promises of economic and technical assistance to Burma. And even the Chinese Communists who have far from solved their own development problems are supporting the effort, mostly recently with a $22.4 million grant to Cambodia.

THERE is no escaping the conclusion that if the Russians sustain their new approach the West will be faced with difficult problems. However, it must be constantly kept in mind that although the Soviets may find some benefits in the spread of "neutralism" in the region, their ultimate objective can only be realized with the establishment of Communist regimes. Khrushchev made this point eminently clear on his recent visit to Burma when he emphasized to Rangoon students that "Communism will ultimately win."

At this stage in their current campaign the Soviets are primarily concerned with making both the ideas and the political manifestations of Communism more respectable in the eyes of Southeast Asia. Locally as well as internationally the Communists are seeking to reduce the extent of open hostility toward them. In particular they are striving to make it appear as though there is no very big gap between themselves and democratic elements. At the same time they are constantly striving to represent Communism as the wave of the future by holding forth the image of Russia and China as countries who have solved the basic problems of rapid industrial development.

The endeavor to make Communism more respectable does not seem to be based on the assumption that it will be possible to win over completely to Communism the current leaders of Southeast Asia. If the

LUCIAN W. PYE *is Assistant Professor of Political Science and a staff member of the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of the forthcoming book,* Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: A Study in Political Behavior.

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Soviets really believe that they can convert the U Nu's and the Sukarno's then they have committed themselves to such an unrealistic course that there is little ground for concern. Actually the Russians seem to have recognized the possibilities inherent in a new feature in the political life of most Southeast Asian countries. This is the possibility that political power can shift according to the outcome of general elections.

Since 1950, when the Communists began to recognize that they were not likely to gain immediate power through their attempts at "armed struggle," the Southeast Asian parties have been somewhat unsure of the direction in which they should concentrate their efforts. They turned to strengthening their organizations, and seeking to subvert various key elements such as student groups and trade unions. However, it was apparently not clear to many party members where this might ultimately lead. In the meantime, wherever possible, the Communists have competed in elections, but they have been slow in fully mobilizing for such efforts. Apparently they have been partly inhibited by the doctrinal attitude that elections are only a "bourgeois game." Now, however, it can be expected that the local parties will take more seriously the possibility of gaining power through general elections.

THE Russian role in this development has been largely to encourage a climate of opinion which will make it possible for Communism to be accepted as a legitimate part of the political process of at least some of the countries. The Russians seem to be bent on insuring that should any of the Southeast Asian parties succeed in gaining the degree of popular support that the French and Italian parties have, they will not be denied control of the administrative organs of government. Already the new Soviet tactics are making it more difficult for the national leaders of the "neutralist" countries to communicate to their populations their precise attitudes toward Communism. In the past these leaders have sought to make a distinction between the local Communist Parties, whom they have considered to be beyond the pale of respectability, and the Communist countries of Russia and China with whom they have been prepared to carry on friendly, normal international relations. In the future it is likely that they will have increasing difficulty in making this rather fine distinction.

The problem is made more serious by the fact that in most of the Southeast Asian countries the process of political development has not yet produced strong, responsible opposition parties committed to democratic institutions. Indeed, in some Southeast Asian countries it is the Communists alone who stand as a strong alternative to the ruling group. In these cases the Communists are seeking to minimize the feeling that they represent an extremist movement. In the recent Burmese elections the main theme of the Communists was essentially one of accepting much of the government's program but claiming that "we can do it better." Thus, they argued, U Nu was "correct" in keeping out American influences and seeking aid from Russia, but that they could realize these two objectives more effectively. The Communists seem to be counting on the prospect that even if all goes well in the field of economic development people will inevitably become more willing to take the gamble of voting for a change, particularly if it doesn't seem as though such a change would be too great. It is disturbing that even at this stage, 30 percent of the Burmese who were given the opportunity to vote for the Communist National Front Party did so.

THE task of meeting the new Soviet challenge is complicated by the fact that it comes at a time when American policies in Southeast Asia are beginning to shift from those dictated by the Korean War. During the period when the military struggle was our main concern, we were anxious to obtain the moral support of all Southeast Asian governments, and this led to strained relations with the "neutralist" countries. However, with the Korean conflict receding into the background we are able to revert to our true course of energetically supporting the development of genuinely independent countries in the region. The difficulty is that the timing of developments is such that it may appear as though we were only responding to the Soviet initiative.

For example, since the Russians began giving economic aid a new note appeared in Communist propaganda about American aid. In the past the Communists have maintained, of course, that American aid is only a veiled form of imperialism. Now, however, the Communists seem ready to argue that one does not need to be friendly with the West in order to receive American aid and that those countries who have committed themselves to SEATO are no better off than those who have remained "neutral." Recently the Communists in Burma and Indonesia have been citing the case of Ceylon to the effect that America will not reduce its aid even if a people elect a government less friendly to the West. It would be disastrous if we were to overreact to such propaganda.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the great advantage that the West has is that our policy objectives can be fully and completely realized if all the countries in Southeast Asia can achieve their aspirations and become healthy, independent societies committed to republican institutions of government. On the other hand the Russian objectives require the establishment of Communist regimes. We must continue to recognize, just as the Russians do, that there is a whale of a difference between a Communist government and a "neutralist" one.

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*SEARCH FOR A NEW BASIS OF AUTHORITY*

# Shifts in the Satellites

by ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

IN MARCH, 1953, the political image of Joseph Stalin loomed large on the eastern European horizon. The opposition was terrorized and scattered. State power was solidly in the hands of Communist leaders with lengthy Moscow connections. The ruling parties had purged their ranks of the "nationalist deviation" which was said to have included some of the top party leaders. The "People's Democracy" was proclaimed to be a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the Stalinist experience of the Soviet Union was made the obligatory pattern for social and economic development. Eastern Europe was being integrated economically through the instrumentality of the KOMEKON (Council for Mutual Economic Aid), set up in 1949 as the Soviet answer to the Marshall Plan. The struggle for collectivization and rapid industrial development characterized the economic life of the captive nations.

Within this broad pattern, however, there were significant differences among the various countries. Some satellite regimes, essentially for reasons of expediency, managed to dilute Stalinism into somewhat less violent forms. In Poland, for instance, while the "nationalist deviation" within the party was exorcised as early as 1948-49 under the impact of Tito's expulsion from the Kominform, Gomulka and Spychalski, the chief "deviationists," were arrested only in 1951. They were not executed (although numerous executions of anti-Communists did take place). In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, on the other hand, some of the top party leaders and their colleagues were put to death after spectacular treason trials. Kostov, Rajk and Slansky were the leading victims among those hanged. The pattern was, similarly, uneven in the case of collectivization: by the end of 1952 about 15 percent of the arable land had been socialized in Poland, 25.5 percent in Hungary, 25.7 percent in Czechoslovakia, 29.7 percent in Rumania and 47.3 percent in Bulgaria.

All of the satellites, however, bore the unmistakable imprint of Soviet control, and the forcible imitation of Soviet development, resulting in accentuated internal terrorism and sacrifice, made these regimes increasingly dependent on Moscow. It is not unlikely that Stalin was aware of this and in view of the Titoist experience was so insistent upon such policy of imitation. Public statements by satellite leaders were characterized by servile submission to Moscow, and in Poland a former Soviet marshal took command of the Polish armed forces. A symbolic expression of this subservience was the demonstrative adulation of Stalin in which all of the satellite leaders and newspapers engaged. In a characteristic assertion, an Hungarian newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* (Dec. 21, 1952), flatly proclaimed him to be "the greatest man of all ages" while on the same day Radio Prague mused "So calm, wise, human, sincere and illuminated by the stars. . . . Behold! This is Stalin!"

His death in March, 1953, initiated a period of uncertainty. At first, things went on much as before. The satellite regimes engaged in elaborate mourning, they vowed to remain forever true to Stalin's mission, they continued their domestic campaigns and pressures. But their dependence on Moscow meant that they could not remain insensitive to events taking place in the USSR itself. And as pointed out in other papers in this issue, this was the period of Malenkov, of the liquidation of Beria, and of the consumers' goods policy. Changes accordingly had also to take place in the satellite systems. Those which had gone further with Stalinization now relented. Those that had lagged responded less sharply.

THE most dramatic change occurred in Hungary with the proclamation by Imre Nagy in July, 1953, of a "New Course." Nagy spelled out a long list of concessions which the regime was going to make, the most important being that peasants previously forced to collectivize would be allowed to leave the collective farms. Within a year 51 percent of the collective farmers took advantage of this opportunity and 12 percent of the collective farms had to be disbanded altogether. In Poland, on the other hand, where the regime was faced by a homogenous group of 26 million people, deeply nationalistic, religious and with a long tradition of anti-Russianism, the leaders continued to steer a middle course. Having not gone all the way with an imitation of Stalinism, they reacted most cautiously to the New Course and no major departure from past policies followed.

In all of the satellites, however, the political atmosphere became somewhat less oppressive. Discussions among writers, for instance, became less stereotyped, more disagreements were expressed in print, even some

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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *is the author of* The Permanent Purge—Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism, *and co-author with C. J. Friedrich of the forthcoming* Totalitarian Dictatorship.

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sharp criticisms of the existing way of life were published. In the economic sphere, several regimes granted tax reductions to their populations, thereby relieving some of the oppressive fiscal burdens. In Rumania, the construction of the notorious Danube-Black Sea Canal was abandoned. After Beria's liquidation, the satellite press imitated the Soviet campaign on behalf of "socialist legality" and some prisoners, including a few political, were amnestied. Collective leadership was proclaimed to be the mode of the day and the practice of centralizing several top posts in one person (such as Premier and first Party Secretary) was abandoned. Also following the Soviet practice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was split into two separate agencies in an ostensible effort to assure "socialist legality."

The death of Stalin occurred, furthermore, at a time when the Republican Administration was taking office in the USA. Many people behind the Iron Curtain believed that President Eisenhower's statements about "liberation" would be followed by political action and the death of Stalin seemed to create a situation worth exploiting. It was within this context of uncertainty, hope and change that the East German uprising of June 17 and the somewhat earlier Czech riots (prompted by a currency reform) occurred. Their collapse marked for most East Europeans the end of any hopes of a radical change. From now on, any amelioration in their lot could come only from within. The post-Stalin relaxation tended to strengthen such views.

Hopes that the New Course would assume significant proportions declined, however, after the January, 1955, Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The pattern for satellite development was thus again set in Moscow. The New Course, which was never really given an opportunity to crystallize, obediently passed into oblivion. Collectivization was resumed, although again at an uneven pace: by the end of 1955 the socialized sector accounted for 62 percent of the arable land in Bulgaria, 45 percent in Czechoslovakia, 35 percent in Rumania, 33 percent in Hungary and East Germany, and 24 percent in Poland. In Hungary, Nagy was deposed within a month of Malenkov's fall, and Rakosi resumed his dominant role. The bonds of economic integration with the USSR were supplemented by the Warsaw Treaty which placed the Eastern European armies under the combined command of Soviet Marshal Konev with his HQ officially located in Moscow. Nonetheless, the pattern of internal developments did not return to the one prior to Stalin's death. The atmosphere was still one of groping, of waiting to see what happens in Moscow where the post-Stalin leaders were themselves engaged in major readjustments.

Hungary's Matyas Rakosi



However, the most recent phase in Soviet-satellite relations was initiated not only, as in the past, by events in Moscow but, unlike the past, in Belgrade. The visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade in May, 1955, and the resulting denunciation of past Soviet policy with respect to Yugoslavia was an implicit rejection of the arbitrary insistence on the blind imitation of Stalinist experience. This was further made explicit at the 20th Party Congress when Khrushchev announced that socialism may be constructed by methods other than those followed by the Soviets in the past, and specifically referred to Yugoslavia as a country engaged in the building of socialism. His statement, in effect, negated the obligation of the satellite regimes to follow blindly the Soviet pattern of development, and allowed them to make adjustments (which some in the past were making surreptitiously) to their local situation. Of course, the new line was not an unmitigated blessing to all the satellite leaders those, who had slavishly imitated Stalin, had reason to pause anxiously as the new policy provided their intra-party opponents with much needed ammunition.

THIS, however, was not to be the only source of embarrassment to Stalinist satellite leaders. An even greater shock reverberated about a week later after Khrushchev's secret night address to the Congress in which Stalin was toppled from his pedestal. The substance of the speech spread rapidly and was apparently reinforced by a letter sent to the satellite capitals. And in Belgrade, *Borba,* the official Tito paper, spread it out for all the world to read. The new policy of "anti-Stalinism" concentrated particularly on the later phase of Stalin's rule, contrasting it with the more "beneficial" qualities of his earlier period. This to the satellite leaders, however, unlike their Soviet colleagues, meant the *entire era* of their dominion.

Reactions again varied. In Bulgaria and Hungary, they were further complicated by pressure from Tito that anti-Titoism be identified with Stalinism. After a few weeks of cautious restraint during which the party leaders repeated vague slogans about "the cult of the personality," while under steady bombardment from the Yugoslav press which urged them to "purge themselves" of their past guilt, the Stalinist dams broke. On March 27 Rakosi publicly rehabilitated comrade Rajk, claiming that his conviction (the hanging was not mentioned) was a product of hostile provocation. *Szabad Nep* engaged in this connection in a lengthy and involved explanation to the effect that such things were the consequences of the cult of personality. The reaction within the regime was one of confusion. It seems, however, that many members felt the time had come for Rakosi to go. At the Hungarian

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Writers' Federation meeting Rakosi was allegedly called a "Judas" and a "murderer." *Szabad Nep*, presumably on Rakosi's orders, attacked in turn the "slanderers" and "Right Opportunists." Moscow maintained silence.

Similarly in Bulgaria, the regime at first limited itself to pious editorials in *Rabotnichesko Delo,* like "For a New Upsurge in Party Work" (April 9) which condemned the cult of the individual. Nonetheless, these attacks soon linked the name of Stalin with that of Vulko Chervenkov, the Premier. His fate was sealed when the official announcement of April 14 rehabilitating the hanged Kostov also condemned the Premier for having practiced one-man rule. Three days later, Chervenkov resigned and was replaced, in the midst of attacks on his "brutality," by Anton Yugov, a former Minister of the Interior, in the past attacked by Chervenkov for his "lack of vigilance."

The Yugoslavs, for whose benefit these rehabilitations were staged, were not satisfied. Radio Belgrade staged a parody of the Rajk trial in which the accused confessed to having wanted to conquer India in order to attack the USSR from the south, while the daily *Nova Makedonija* continued to prod the Bulgarians by citing alleged reports from Sofia to the effect that Bulgarian people "are indignant" that changes have stopped with the firing of Chervenkov. In outraged tones, the paper reported on April 26 that the Party High School in Sofia is still named after Chervenkov and is still headed by his wife! Even the liquidation of the Kominform did not prevent *Borba* from criticizing the official Moscow announcement of its demise. The Yugoslavs objected to the reference to the Kominform's "positive role" in the past. On the whole, however, Belgrade welcomed warmly the post-20th Party Congress events while continuing to exert pressure on the Bulgarians and Hungarians to go even further. Moscow seemed to be willing to tolerate this for the sake of closer ties with Tito.

EVENTS in Czechoslovakia and Poland, on the other hand, seemed to be more directly the product of the Soviet anti-Stalin line and of domestic pressures. In both countries the leadership was aware that alternatives still exist which might displace the present leaders if the past is fully renounced. At the same time, strong democratic (and social-democratic) traditions made some concessions necessary in view of the new Soviet line. Thus comrade Novotny, the Czech party secretary, warned: "The fight against the cult of the personality . . . does not mean to minimize the role of the leading cadres and to weaken their authority." At the same time, Rude Pravo came out with editorials on "The Force of Truth" and "Social Democratism Should Be Developed More Boldly" which urged both a critical reconsideration of the past while calling upon the people "to have faith in the Party." In token of their good intentions, the leaders fired A. Cepicka from the Politburo and as Minister of National Defense, but the charges against Slansky and Clementis were not refuted. Czechoslovak Politburo member, Siroky, in his May 11th address to the Central Committee of the Slovak C.P., defined the regime's position: Slansky was now being blamed for having caused "brutal methods of force and oppression" within the party, and for this he was justly punished. He was not, however, to be blamed for "Titoism"—that was Beria's provocation. The prevailing mood was to steer a cautious middle course.

In Poland, similar ambivalence can be noted but in the context of much greater ferment. The attacks on Stalin and Stalinism have gone further in Poland than in any other Communist country. The opening gun was fired by Jerry Morawski, a party secretary, who in a lengthy discussion attempted to dissect Stalinism into its positive and negative phases, but without mincing any words about the latter. Warsaw Radio picked up the cue and talked of Stalin's "Monstrous and pathological suspicion," even implying that he had been involved in the "Jewish doctors' plot" of 1953. At the same time, either indicating some confusion among the population or using this as a device for the exposition of the new line, Warsaw Radio cited questions from its listeners, as for instance: "Why is this being discussed only now and in such an unclear manner? Why were these mistakes not pointed out during Stalin's lifetime?" Some writers attacked the recent past as the "Period of Fear" and called upon the regime to undo the injustices committed against the anti-Nazi underground forces, suppressed brutally after 1945. In early April a Polish architects' conference violently condemned the previous practice of imitating Soviet architectural styles, and Premier Cyrankiewicz pointedly suggested that the architects could now take advantage of Western experience also. In an interesting insight into democracy-by-command, Polish Parliament members were instructed to become more inquisitive about governmental operations. As far as Polish-Soviet relations are concerned, one newspaper (*Zycie Warszawy*) went as far as to speak of the Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav and Polish roads to socialism, adding that:

> The convinction that almost every Soviet experience should be transplanted and applied did not create in the countries of People's Democracy a climate which would favor independence, creative thought, and initiative. . . .

On a more concrete level, the Polish Government announced that Gomulka and Spychalski had been released. An amnesty decree was issued involving 80,000 persons, of whom 30,000 were to be freed. Radkiewicz, the head of the secret police until 1955, was dropped from the cabinet and two of his closest associates arrested. The Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General and the Military Prosecutor General, the head of the Committee for Public Security (who replaced Radkiewicz in 1955),

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the Minister of Culture and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were all fired. These changes, however, were soon overshadowed by the announcement of May 6 that Jakob Berman had "resigned" as deputy premier and member of the Politburo. Berman had been considered to be the *eminence grise* of the Stalinist regime in Poland and, after Bierut, the second most powerful Communist in Poland. His fall, and Bierut's death in March, suggested that an internal shift in the power balance may now be taking place in Warsaw.

At the same time, however, efforts were being exerted to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. The party leadership, made vacant by Bierut's sudden death, was filled by E. Ochab, noted in the past for staunchly upholding the Stalinist line against Gomulka. Ochab appears to be Khrushchev's personal choice—after Bierut's funeral in Warsaw, Khrushchev stayed behind while the Soviet delegation left for home, and it was during his presence that Ochab was selected. Shortly after his promotion, Ochab attacked those party members who engage in excessive criticism as a consequence of the new atmosphere, and went to some pains to point out that Gomulka's rehabilitation does not involve an acknowledgment that he had been right. This point was also made by Morawski. The leadership was thus obviously attempting to release some accumulated tensions, and even to undo some past excesses, without discrediting its own past. Stalin, hated by most Poles, was quite convenient. In late April, in a long *Pravda* article, Ochab again repeated his attacks on "opportunism and nationalism," branding the critics as "petty bourgeois." And in a public speech, he declared:

> We can assure our Soviet brethren that no machinations of imperialist adventurers, remnants of reaction, will be able to weaken the alliance and eternal friendship between People's Poland and the Soviet Union.

Even the amnesty, on closer examination, lost some of its flavor. Of those affected by it, only 9,000 were political prisoners, and of those to be released only 4,500 were political. And as a further hint that the past was not to be undone, the party paper *Trybuna Ludu* attacked another Warsaw paper, *Zycie Warszawy*, for suggesting that the amnesty was an effort to correct a past wrong. Far from it, *Trybuna Ludu* declared—the amnesty is an act of magnanimity toward those who wronged the "people's state" and is to be viewed as a manifestation of strength.

THE situation is thus still in flux. In all of the satellite systems, some of the old forms are giving way and others are being reshaped. In some, the main stimulus for change is external, in others domestic. Stalinism, however, had signified too much for these regimes to be swept away by a series of spectacular gestures or bombastic assertions. Stalinism as a system had come to mean: (a) a method of rule within the party, involving elimination of all deviations; (b) a pattern for Soviet political and economic control, including selection of top leaders; (c) a model of development, stressing Soviet experience; (d) an infallible code for policy formulation in terms of accepted Stalinist frame of reference.

The satellite regimes, like the Soviet leadership, are now searching for a new basis for power. Rigid Stalinism cannot work without Stalin, and each leadership has to create its own purpose and its own patterns, lest succession lead to disintegration. A new pattern has accordingly been set by the 20th Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress and the satellite leaders have no choice but to attempt to adjust to it in terms of their specific circumstances. What we have witnessed so far is a relatively mechanical adjustment to the new situation by firmly entrenched party leadership in Bulgaria or Rumania, not to mention Albania, while in the other satellites a degree of ferment is noticeable on the lower levels which, in places like Poland where attacks on Stalinism have been most scathing, could conceivably become dangerous to the regime. For this reason, the Polish leadership is so careful to point out that it had been correct in the past and that excesses committed were errors of degree and not kind. In the case of East Germany, the main significance of the anti-Stalin lines, and of some consessions made, is in terms of the SED appeals to the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats in West Germany for common action rather than of any major domestic import. Whether this diversity can become politically significant will depend, however, on the extent to which it can affect the basic patterns of the system now established.

Until now, only the last two aspects of Stalinism as a system have been affected, but to an uncertain degree. Conceivably, arguments could arise over future patterns of development, and blind belief in the infallibility of the leadership may have been shaken. Instead of relying on an accepted frame of reference, party leaders and satellite intellectuals have to operate on the basis of anticipated reaction by Moscow and by their party colleagues to their statements and action. This introduces an element of uncertainty, especially as new situations do not allow mere repetition of old slogans. But so far, the basic patterns of control have not changed and, indeed, are not likely to do so unless Moscow is willing to disband its bloc by withdrawing its support from the satellite leaders, thereby relinquishing also the economic advantages of its domination. Also, we must not forget that the recent measures may make these satellite regimes considerably more palatable to their populations, and could thus ultimately strengthen their internal position.

Western expectations of the spread of "Titoism" among the satellites must take into account that Titoism was made possible by the internal strength of the Tito regime. Such strength still appears to be lacking in places like Poland or Czechoslovakia, etc., where indigenous elements within the party might possibly contemplate

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such a Titoist line. In places where such strength might exist, the top leadership has exterminated those elements that might have appeared to favor such a policy. The paradox of this situation may be that by the time such regimes as the Polish do become sufficiently entrenched to afford "Titoism," many of the existential pressures which produced such Titoism in the past may disappear, whereas such factors as fear of German revisionism (a factor of Soviet control which the West consistently underestimates) and common bonds of industrialization will help to keep the Soviet bloc together. Nonetheless, the present situation is plainly embarrassing to the satellite rulers who are attempting to conform to the new line without destroying the fundamental patterns of their rule. In such periods of transition even the unforeseen can happen.

***THE "CULT OF PERSONALITY" DIES HARD***

# France — an Awkward Moment

**by SERGE DE GUNZBURG**

PIERRE HERVE, a brilliant Communist writer, hero of the Resistance and former editor of the Communist weekly *Action,* published at the beginning of this year a book which denounced the "fetishism" and dogmatism of the present French Communist leadership and, in substance, called on them to follow the example given by the Soviet Communist Party since Stalin's death. M. Hervé was thereupon ignominously expelled from the Party. He had had the audacity of writing, *before* Mr. Khrushchev's pronouncement at the 20th Party Congress, that in view of the changed circumstances in the world and of the strength of the Socialist countries, the workers parties might be able to seize power from the bourgeoisie without necessarily resorting to violent means. The question here arises, why was it easier for the French Communist Party to change overnight from pacifism to chauvinistic patriotism and anti-Hitlerism in 1935; from anti-Hitlerism to neo-pacifism in 1939; from an independent "French" Communist line to ultra-Stalinism, than to give up the Stalin myth, which, after all, was imposed on the French from outside?

The answer's not too hard to find, for if the cult of personality was wrong in the case of Stalin, who after all had led the Soviet people to victory in the war, who had achieved the industrialization and collectivization of the Soviet Union and made of it one of the two most powerful nations in the world, how much less justifiable that cult was in the case of French Communist leader Maurice Thorez whose war record in Moscow was not so brilliant, whose infallibility was all the more questionable in that he never entirely recovered from the stroke suffered in 1950. To condemn Stalin in France meant condemnation of Thorez and of all the present Party leadership.

Other novelties of the 20th Party Congress in Moscow caused less embarrassment to the French than the condemnation of Stalin but still raised problems. The new theory of the possibility of seizing power through parliamentary means and without violence meant that increased efforts had to be made not only to win over Socialist workers but to achieve the "United front," an alliance or a coalition with the Socialist leadership. And this came at the most awkward time. Not only are the Socialists in power in France, but they are trying to keep Algeria by force and carrying out mobilization measures which are hardly popular among the French working classes. On the eve of the 20th Congress, the Communists voted in favor of the government that was demanding special and enlarged powers to deal with the Algerian situation. They could hardly do otherwise as an adverse vote might unseat Guy Mollet and Christian Pineau who had accepted an invitation to go to Moscow. The Communists could, of course, argue that the special powers granted Mollet did not preclude the possibility of a negotiated settlement. But when the contingent was actually called up and young Frenchmen sent to Algeria, how could the Communists continue to support the Socialist Government? And if they oppose it, what of the "United front?"

The theory of the non-inevitability of war was less difficult for French Communists to endorse as much stress had already been put on peaceful co-existence and the "Geneva spirit." But there is one aspect of the anti-war line which *is* causing difficulty. Thorez had gone out of his way to condemn the theory that an atomic war meant the destruction of mankind and to support the

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SERGE DE GUNZBURG *was* Agence France Presse *correspondent in China from 1945 to 1947; in Moscow from 1949 to 1951; in India, from 1952 to 1953, and is now with* AFP *in Paris.*

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extreme Stalinist view that it meant only the destruction of capitalism. How could he go back on this?

Unlike the Hungarian, Polish or British Communists, for instance, who faced squarely the difficulties arising from the new Soviet line, admitted their own errors and even changed their leadership, the French Communist attitude was to play down the Soviet changes and even to ignore certain aspects of the new line. Stalin had certainly made a few mistakes, but this did not mean that Thorez had been wrong. Much capital is made of Thorez's 1946 interview with the "Times," which previously everyone had tried to forget, in which he had said that "there are other roads to Socialism than the road followed by the Russian Communists." The implication is that Thorez was right in anticipating Khrushchev, by 10 years.

WHILE the 20th Congress was headline news and comments on the new Soviet line filled the editorial columns of all "bourgeois" newspapers, the French Communist organ, *l'Humanité,* gave it very cautious reporting. Khrushchev's opening report and Bulganin's economic report were front-page news, but Mikoyan's criticism of Stalin's theoretical mistakes, his condemnation of the falsification of history and his rehabilitation of Antonov Ovseenko and of Kossor, the Ukrainian leaders who had been liquidated as Trotskiites, were not mentioned. And, of course, no mention was made of Khrushchev's speech on February 25 in which he "debunked" Stalin. The first mention of it appeared only on March 19, 20 and 21 when the Moscow correspondent of *l'Humanité* very cautiously broke some of the facts in three carefully worded articles, published in the inside pages of the newspaper. While he explained that, according to Khrushchev, Stalin had carried the cult of personality too far after 1934 and had made some errors, *l'Humanité* headlines were all on Algerian developments.

Apart from these three short stories, practically no mention was made of the 20th Congress for a whole month. The French Communist stand was broken to the public only on March 22 when *l'Humanité* published the full text of the resolution voted by the French Central Committee. The resolution noted

> The erroneous or excessive theses in some of Stalin's works, for instance on the signs of a general crisis of capitalism, on the economic problems at the present stage of development of the USSR, on the continuation of class struggle after the victorious construction of Socialism.

It added that "the violation of the Leninist principle of collective leadership by Stalin and his personal methods weakened the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party" but it concluded that "the frank criticism by the 20th Congress on this count by no means abolishes but puts in its right place the role and merits of Stalin as a theoretician and as a leader."

A few days later, on March 27, *l'Humanité* published Thorez's personal comment on the 20th Congress. The problem of the cult of personality appeared only in the last column and, again, the errors of Stalin were minimized. Thorez wrote:

> The fault of Comrade Stalin was to ignore, during the last period of his activity, certain rules of behavior and leadership of the party which he himself had taught to Communists throughout the world, in particular in his work "The Questions of Leninism." . . . The necessary criticism of certain errors does not diminish in any way Stalin's historical merits.

In May *l'Humanité* published Thorez's speech before the Central Committee in which he vindicated his own stand and minimized the errors made by the French Communist Party. Thorez had to pay at least lip service to "collective leadership" and so he did. He admitted that it was wrong to speak of the Communist Party as "the Thorez party" but implied that the hero-worship of himself had been conducted against his will. While Khrushchev frankly admitted that the break with Tito had been a blunder, Thorez still defended the stand taken in 1948 by the Cominform:

> During the discussion within the Information Bureau [the Cominform] criticism of certain aspects of the policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party was perfectly normal among Communist parties. We believe that they were correct. The Yugoslav comrades were entitled to dispute them. In fact the person who expressed the most extreme views concording with the erroneous trend (which trend, in our opinion, was then followed in Yugoslavia) was dismissed. I mean Djilas. In what way were we wrong? It was when we went on from this criticism to an inadmissible intervention in the life of the Yugoslav Communist Party. We went beyond the powers of the Information Bureau.

In other words, contrary to Khrushchev's own admission, contrary to the new line of the Soviet Communist Party, Stalin and Zhdanov were right in the 1948 dispute and Tito was wrong, at least from the point of view of doctrine. It is hardly surprising that this stand of the French Communists drew a strong rebuke from the Yugoslavs, but their protest was never published in *l'Humanité.*

WHILE the new line officially defined by the 20th Congress could not be ignored altogether by the French Communists, other Soviet developments were partially or entirely ignored. Readers of *l'Humanité* would vaguely be aware that Bela Kuhn has been rehabilitated and that an error had been committed in the trial of Rajk. But other rehabilitations were never mentioned,

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nor was the recent reform of the Soviet penal code and the abolition of Soviet concentration camps. How could *l'Humanité* report the abolition of camps which according to its previous reporting had never existed? The French Communists could not deny that miscarriages of justice which had been admitted by the Soviet leaders had occurred in the Soviet Union, but their main preoccupation was to whitewash Stalin. In his speech before the Central Committee on May 9, Thorez said:

> It would be childish to say that judicial errors, for instance, arose from the will of one man or from a group of men. Things were much more complicated. One cannot forget how an atmosphere had been created, boosted by external pressure.



French Communist leaders Marcel Cachin, Arthur Remette and Maurice Thorez.

JUDGING from its stand on the cult of personality, the Yugoslav dispute, the miscarriages of justice, one would be tempted to say that the French Communist Party is the last Stalinite Party in the world. And so far, the stand taken by Thorez has not yet been publicly challenged within the Party, with the exception of Pierre Hervé's challenge, and he was expelled for being right too early. This does not mean that some lively discussions did not occur *in private* within the Central Committee when it discussed on May 9 and 10 of this year the draft-resolution which will be presented to the French Party Congress next month.

However, the draft, as finally adopted by the Central Committee in its May session, endorsed the viewpoint taken from the start by Thorez. It played up Thorez's advocacy since 1946 of the theory of "various paths leading to Socialism," mentioned very casually in one single sentence the condemnation of the cult of personality in Stalin's days and approved the wide circulation of Thorez's works.

It is on a side-issue only that Thorez's leadership has been openly questioned. And surprisingly enough, that issue is birth control. It all started with the publication at the beginning of this year of a book by a Communist author named Derogy, entitled *Children in Spite of Us*. On April 30, *l'Humanité* published an open letter from Maurice Thorez who strongly rebuked Derogy on the grounds that neomalthusianism (the Marxian terminology for birth control) had been condemned by the Classics of Marxism. The party and *l'Humanité* were immediately flooded with letters from the rank and file, many of whom asked on what authority Thorez condemned Derogy's theory. In his speech before the Central Committee on May 9, Thorez replied that his position was in conformity with the classics such as Marx and Lenin and had been endorsed by the French Communist Party in 1936 and confirmed by the Central Committee in 1938. In other words, he admitted that he formulated the Party line on his own authority, without any prior collective discussion on a question which is most controversial and directly affects the lives of many families. But Thorez went further and disputed even the right of the membership to question him:

> If a young member asks us questions on neomalthusianism, we shall tell him that he is wrong and we'll explain to him the Party line. But if we are dealing with comrades who have been in the Party for many years, they cannot allow themselves to voice on these questions a criticism which is by no means consistent with Marxist-Leninism.

This stand of Thorez raises a much more serious problem than the direct issue of birth control, however important birth control may be to many Communist followers. While the Soviet Communists practice collective leadership, advocate criticism and self-criticism within the Party, condemn dogmatic pronouncements by leaders and a dogmatic interpretation of Marxism and advocate a living dynamic interpretation of the Marxian theory, are the French Communists going to abide by Stalinist methods? While Khrushchev has to consult the Central Committee over major policy decisions, and the rank and file are invited to criticize the local authorities at least, will Thorez be allowed in France to make pronouncements on his own authority, to refuse discussion of vital issues by the Party members and interpret the great classics in the most extreme and dogmatic way?

Although very little is known of the discussions within the Central Committee, it appears that Thorez has so far managed to hold his own. But it is hardly likely that the French Communist Party, which has been in the past the most subservient among all Communist Parties to the Soviet line, should be able to continue indefinitely to ignore the changes brought about by the 20th Congress, and to remain indefinitely loyal to Stalin rather than to Khrushchev.

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*SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST*

# Courtship of the Arabs

by WALTER Z. LAQUEUR

NOWHERE in the world has Soviet policy achieved as much success since Stalin died as in the Middle East. But it is not an altogether surprising success story: nowhere in the world were conditions better, more conducive for the spread of Soviet influence. Soviet foreign policy under Stalin was far too dogmatic to realize and exploit the immense potentialities inherent in the Middle Eastern situation in the early 1950s. His successors were more flexible (and less scrupulous) and realized, quite correctly from their point of view, that the Middle East offered them even better chances than the rest of Asia (likewise neglected up to that date) for a variety of reasons: in India and Pakistan, in Ceylon and Burma, the British exodus had been generally taken as a sign of goodwill; the basis for an improvement, or at least a normalization of relations with the West had been created. Apart from a few minor issues (Goa, New Guinea) there were no bones of contention left. There was distrust of the West in Asia, to be sure, but little active hate outside the local Communist movements. The situation in the Middle East, however, was radically different: the evacuation of Egypt by the British and of Syria and Lebanon by the French, was interpreted not as a sign of goodwill but of weakness. It did not reduce at all the hate which now became mixed with contempt. This has certain historical and psychological reasons which cannot be analyzed within the framework of the present study. But there were other reasons too which made a rapprochement between the Arab countries and the West improbable, and a further deterioration in relations very likely indeed: the fact that the bloc of Arab countries collided everywhere throughout Africa and the Middle East with either direct Western interests (such as the Middle Eastern oil, Western strategic positions, Africa) or with Israel and the pro-Western Baghdad pact powers in their struggle for the creation of a great new empire reaching from the Atlantic to India, and to be headed by Egypt. Supporting these Arab aspirations, the Soviet leaders correctly assumed, would both enhance their prestige in the Arab world and thwart, or at least neutralize, Western efforts to establish a defense organization in the Middle East.

This support was not given at once after Stalin's death. For some time the general line taken *vis-à-vis* the Arab governments continued to be highly critical and even outrightly hostile. The great change came in late spring 1955 when the way was paved for the subsequent rapprochement between Cairo (and Damascus and Djedda) and Moscow. Since then there has been a large amount of political and economic exchange between the Soviet Union and the Arab bloc headed by Cairo, but the most important development has been the supply of large quantities of modern heavy arms to Egypt and Syria.

Western policy in the Middle East, however unwise and inefficient, was in the last resort to keep peace, to reduce the danger of war as far as possible. By arming Egypt and Syria, Russia made an Arab "second round" against Israel a distinct possibility, if not a probability, as events over the last year have shown—quite apart from other latent possibilities such as promoting armed warfare in places such as North Africa, South Arabia, the Persian Gulf area, etc. There is much evidence to show that the possibility of a local war in the Middle East was not greatly dreaded—if not deliberately provoked—in Moscow throughout 1955. Whatever the outcome of such a war, Russia and Communism were likely to benefit from it. A second Arab defeat in a war against Israel would undoubtedly have catastrophic consequences in the Arab world, and the emergence of one or more "Popular Democracies" in the Middle East would become a distinct possibility. If Israel were defeated, however, Russia could be sure of the gratitude of the Arabs, because it would have been only owing to Soviet jets and tanks that this victory was achieved.

RECENT months have seen, however, an additional modification in the Soviet approach to Middle Eastern affairs. Second thoughts seem to have prevailed as to the desirability of a local war in the Middle East—as shown by the statement in April, 1956, according to which a "peaceful and just settlement" was proposed for the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was generally regarded as a mild setback for the Arab governments who had expected from Moscow unqualified support. Several theories have been presented to explain this most recent devel-

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WALTER Z. LAQUEUR *is the author of* Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East *which will be published here in July. He has lived in the Middle East a good part of his life and now edits a new British periodical,* Soviet Culture.

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opment in Soviet policy. According to the argument of one school of thinking the Soviet Union has been disturbed by the strong pan-Islamic tendencies and activities displayed by the Arab bloc, and Egypt in particular which, it is believed, may affect the 30 million Moslems living in Soviet Central Asia. This theory is hardly acceptable, for the Arab bloc has taken great care not to include the Soviet Moslem in its pan-Islamic schemes: even if it had acted otherwise it is highly unlikely that they would have greatly frightened Moscow. Pan-Islamism, as preached from Cairo, may perhaps fascinate some people in Central Africa, but it will hardly make a great stir in Tashkent.

It is more likely that Western reaction to the anti-Israeli line taken by Moscow (coupled with certain other revelations pointing to the persistence of Stalinist anti-Jewish "remnants") has had a certain impact on Moscow. It should be realized that the Soviet leaders are now far more sensitive to Western public opinion than they used to be in years past, what with the popular-front blueprints and all that. However, Israel (with all its friends) is simply too small and unimportant to bring about a change in Soviet policy even on secondary issues. It is far more likely therefore that another consideration has been decisive in recent Soviet thinking about the Middle East. A local war may be in the Soviet interest, but what guarantee is there that it would not get out of hand and become a second Korea? American and British intervention would create an awkward dilemma, to say the least. To prevent this Moscow has followed up its arms shipments with a declaration about the desirability of a peaceful solution. Russia wanted to gain a political and economic foothold in the Middle East—and in this it has largely succeeded. There is no reason to assume that it wants to become at present engaged in any military ventures in the Middle East which may have incalculable consequences.

Some implications of the most recent phase in Soviet Middle Eastern policy are not yet sufficiently clear and it may be preferable to suspend judgment. What has emerged so far is that it does not constitute a radical break with the previous pro-Egyptian and pro-Syrian line, but that support for these countries will continue in future, perhaps in a slightly more discreet way and mainly on the political level. Restraining Colonel Nasser by statements about the desirability of just and peaceful solutions does not mean that Russia will be successful in preventing a Middle Eastern war—even if we take that declaration at its face value: a fairly great amount of arms has been dumped into the Middle East, certainly enough to start a war, and as Colonel Nasser is not a Soviet satellite at this time, Moscow's belated statements about peace in the Middle East, even if sincere, may well prove ineffectual.

INASMUCH as long-range trends are concerned, both Soviet and Western observers seem to agree that Syria is the country most likely to become the first Middle East "Popular Democracy" if present conditions of political anarchy and economic crisis will last for some more years and if the Communists will continue to be as successful as hitherto, both in strengthening their own party (and innumerable "front organizations") and in persuading other political parties to collaborate with them. The situation in Egypt is somewhat different: the Communist movement is illegal there, far weaker than in Syria and internally split. In these conditions the Soviet Union has preferred to deal with the junta headed by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, just as it preferred Kemal Ataturk to the Turkish Communists in the early 1920s. The important difference is, of course, that Russia is now far stronger than it was 30 years ago, while Nasser is weaker than Ataturk was—in view of the absence in Egypt of a fairly broad elite which headed in Turkey the national movement—and many other reasons as well. Another circumstance greatly in Russia's favor is the fact that public opinion in Egypt and most other Arab countries is violently anti-Western (more so, in print at least, than in the Communist countries) and vaguely pro-Soviet, just as it was vaguely pro-Axis in 1934-42. All Arab governments, including the authoritarian rulers, are dependent to a high degree on public opinion and

**Night patrol near a Middle East danger zone—the Gaza Strip.**



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its demands—which has been demonstrated in Jordan.

Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the Baghdad Pact countries, are in a quite different category, seen from Moscow. Sporadic attempts are made by Moscow to woo Turkey which is considered (despite some recent developments) the soundest country internally, where Communism does not stand any conceivable chance. The attitude *vis-à-vis* Iran and Iraq is far less forthcoming: Communism may be temporarily "under control" in these countries as a result of police repression, but the fundamental political and social weaknesses of these countries do not make them exactly formidable adversaries in Soviet eyes. Communism in Israel seems to have been written off for the time being; even a majority of the Israeli "Partisans of Peace" have been estranged by the arms supplies to the Arab countries. But the probable gains in Arab countries seem to outweigh in Soviet eyes the losses in Israel. At the same time it should be pointed out that with regard to Israel (as to most other countries—in contradistinction to the West) Russia has always more than one line of policy ready: rumors about possible Soviet arms shipments to Israel, surprise visits by leading Soviet personalities at the Israeli Embassy in Moscow, the statement of April, 1956, and other hints are scheduled to persuade Israel that a change in the Soviet approach to them is likely—on certain conditions.

Soviet achievements in the Middle East, to sum up, have been highly, though not surprisingly, successful. Temporary, local agreements with the West about Middle Eastern affairs are possible though not very likely, over-all big deals appear to be out of question even if the hands of the West were not tied. Soviet leaders have nothing against the idea of Colonel Nasser and other Arab leaders of "outplaying" East against West; it has given them the opening they needed and they are sure that things will continue to move very much their way—whatever the original intentions of Nasser and his friends. They are not concerned at all about the prospect that they may help to strengthen a new force which may eventually turn against them. They tend to assume (correctly, it seems) that the new nationalism in the Middle East which has proved so useful to them is basically destructive, incapable of a sustained constructive effort such as is needed to build up a great national movement or empire, which may be in their way one day—let alone threaten them. Their one main concern at present seems to be the premature emergence of a "Popular Democracy" in specific Middle Eastern style (Syria, for instance) which would act as a warning and deterrent for other Middle Eastern countries. The policy followed is one of preventing shocks as far as humanly possible, of drawing the Arab countries into the Soviet orbit, slowly, step by step, almost imperceptibly. It would be foolish to deny that this policy stands considerable chances of success.

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# The Trend in Literature

by ARTHUR BARRON

THE signs that something was afoot in Soviet literature have appeared with regularity ever since Stalin's death. That event seemed to signal the emergence of appeals from Soviet writers for more freedom, and genuine debates within the government-controlled Union of Writers on the content and goals of Soviet literature. The removal of the rigidly Stalinist "socialist realist," Alexander Fadeyev, from full membership in the Central Committee of the Party (and his subsequent suicide) provide dramatic confirmation of the emergence of a new line.

Recently, these trends culminated in the appearance of extraordinary editorials on Soviet artistic works in the leading literary and Party journals. Among these statements, the most important appeared in *Kommunist,* the official theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since this editorial ("On the Problem of Literary and Art Treatment of the Typical") makes no bones about setting down the line for Soviet writers within the forseeable future, it is worthy of more than passing attention. Hidden in its maze of Party jargonese is a bald admission that the Stalinist literary line produced little that is readable.

The Party opens fire with a broadside at Soviet literary performance since the war. According to *Kommunist,* the performance has not been good. "In the postwar years" Soviet literature has been "mediocre" and "inartistic." It has suffered from "flabbiness" and "colorlessness." Its works have "trailed behind life," have "lacked full-blooded and memorable characters," and have "failed to meet the needs of the people." Soviet writers, for their part, have "gilded reality," "minimized difficulties" and "failed to show shortcomings truthfully." Knowing life "only superficially," they have proven "unable to produce works that are weapons in our struggle with the old and ugly in our life." Instead, they have been content with merely "superficial description."

But it is not merely the bluntness of these remarks that sets the new literary criticism apart. The Party has never shied from taking writers to task. Now however, Soviet literary referees question not only the players, but the rules of the game as well. Socialist realism, long the unassailable basis of Soviet literary theory, is itself under review.

The most important features of socialist realism are "party spirit" (*partinost*) "optimism," and the portrayal of the "positive hero." The new literary line challenges each of these concepts.

Translated literally, *partinost* means bearing-the-spirit of the Party. For all practical purposes, this means that only the Party chooses literary themes and determines their treatment in the Soviet Union. Party wishes are transmitted to Soviet writers through directives, and these are enforced by political and economic pressures. The justification for this arrangement is found in Soviet aesthetics. Philosophically, *partinost* is based on the Soviet belief that it is the major function of literature to "grasp the social essence" of events and to express their historical significance. Since presumably only the Marxist viewpoint enables writers to perceive this social essence, all literature must be cast in the Marxist mold. And since it is the Party which is best able to interpret Marxism, naturally it is the Party which determines literary content and style.

UNFORTUNATELY, while this doctrine works out fine for the Party, *partinost* has had crippling effects on literature. Having defined the social essence of events within the Soviet Union as "the building of Communism," the Party has stubbornly refused to allow Soviet writers to stray an inch from this subject. As a result love, social protest, insight into human personality, are never the direct object of the writer's concern. Instead, Soviet writers must deal exclusively with the problems of production and the Party. In seemingly endless variations, they rework the same basic plot: inspired by a Party hero, Soviet workers overcome all problems and succeed in achieving even higher production.

Second, *partinost* has given a pervasive ideological hue to all literary works. In effect, Soviet writers have become political pamphleteers trumpeting the Party message in all its forms. What passes for dialogue in Soviet novels is really long-winded exhortation from *Pravda.* A fairly recent novel, *On the Way,* deals with the reclamation of farm land in Soviet Estonia. Two of its characters, the simple shepherdess Salme and the old man Somer, exchange this bit of typical Soviet dialogue:

> ". . . Aye, that is how the river flooded us in grandad's time," nodded Somer. "There wasn't any way out for the water. . . ."
>
> "There wasn't then, but there is a way out now," Salme retorted. "The Bolshevik Party teaches us that we can and should fight Nature. The great Soviet scientist, Williams, says that the best way to improve soils like ours is to drain the water. That is why Comrade Stalin has sent a powerful excavator down the river to us. The best people of our village have started a war on the bogs. Comrade Lauba sitting over there is one of our foremost men in this, a real transformer of Nature. . . ."

AS the major criterion of literary merit, *partinost* has been used by the Party to discredit all writers not to its ideological liking, and to deny their works to the Soviet people. With much success, the Party has sought to isolate the Russian people from their own literary traditions and from world literary currents. Pre-Soviet writers of such "questionable" ideological leanings as Dostoevsky, for example, have been denigrated by Soviet critics, and circulation of their works has been actively discouraged. Soviet writers like Babel who failed to meet the Party's ideological standards were purged, forced to recant and re-write their works. Some Soviet authors of stature, like Sholokhov and Pasternak, protested against such conditions by simply not writing for the past 20 years, or by occupying themselves with such safe pursuits as the translation of Shakespeare. The works of unacceptable foreign writers, of course, have rarely been translated in

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ARTHUR BARRON *is the Soviet Affairs Analyst at the Research Institute of America.*

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the Soviet Union. Faulkner, T. S. Eliot, and Joyce, for example, are generally unobtainable.

The net result of all this, say the Party critics today, has been "inartistic" and "mediocre" literature. So the Party has set about to revise the concept of *partinost*. First, without repudiating the concept altogether, the Soviets grudgingly open the door to subjects other than the building of Communism. The new line urges writers not to ignore, "the whole variety of concrete artistic material." Again, the Party states, "realistic art presents all facts and phenomena of life itself and not only in the form of the barren abstraction of social essence." And it points out that "viewing art as merely the incarnation of a given social force results in loss by a work of art of the individual diversity of life, in the creation of abtractions and not characters."

THE revision of the *partinost* concept also allows for a less directly ideological treatment of subject matter. Here the Party seems to repudiate the concept that the major function of literature is to grasp the social essence of a given social force. This approach, the Party now admits, "ignores the things that distinguish art from other forms of ideology." While the Party still stresses similarities between the various ideological forms, it also underlines the differences between them. In a rather astonishing about face the new line concedes that:

> . . . the historian, the economist, and the philosopher study public life so as to show the essence of a given social force or phenomenon. But this does not make them artists. Art is a specific form of the reflection of reality. Artistic cognition of life is governed from its own laws, which differ substantially from those of scientific cognition.

While a far cry from granting that art can exist for its own sake, this is certainly the closest the Soviets have come in recent years to admitting that artists have independent needs and status.

In the past, the Party has distinguished only two types of writers—party men and non-party men. All writers have been placed either in the "progressive" or "reactionary" camp. Now, however, the Soviets are showing signs of becoming less doctrinaire and more cosmopolitan. "One simply cannot divide artists into two politically opposed parties," the new line declares. To do this would be to forget the "universally human features of many typical characters of literature and art that stir people of different social groups of all times." Instead of the mechanical test of whether the author is openly pro-party or anti-party, the Soviets now concede that great artists "may be contradictory about what they perceive." Indeed, the critic "must consider the times and circumstances in which the artist works." In a spirit of generosity, the Party is willing to allow that even non-Communist Western writers, who not only "deny the Party spirit but also abjure it," are also capable of creating "vivid, typical characters and works which serve the cause of progress." If this change of heart is genuine, the Soviet people may in the future be able to enjoy and be stimulated by the free creations of non-party artists. There are indications that greater cultural exchange with the West in the arts will occur. Western impresarios are currently conducting negotiations to this end.

The demand for optimism in Soviet literature has been another major feature of socialist realism. This has meant, in the first place, that all Soviet works end happily. Failure, disappointment, tragedy—none of these had a place in Soviet plots. In *Happiness*, a typical Stalin prize novel, the chief character, after a moderate struggle, succeeds in bringing increased prosperity and a better tomorrow to his collective farm by energizing his workers to greater production. And this, says the Party, is as it should be. In a society which is building Communism, how could it be otherwise?



"They tore my novel to pieces. I haven't the slightest idea what I should write in my defense . . ."
"A good novel." *Krokodil—1955*

BUT the demand for optimism not only required happy endings, the promise of a better future. It required the absence of villains as well. Since, according to the Party, it is the nature of economic relations in a society which determines the nature of Man, in a socialist society evil man cannot appear. Neither, as a result, can he be depicted in literature.

Even worse than this restriction on the writer, however, was the incredible stricture that Soviet literature be free of conflict. Viewing conflict as the tension between good and evil, and failing to see evil in the new socialist society, the Party simply eliminated conflict in literature. Since this position obviously proved untenable, the Party relented enough to allow for conflict between "good and less good," and between good and "remnants of capitalism in our society"—the only evil which it has heretofore been willing to recognize.

Again, though, the new literary line shows promise of change for the better. While falling far short of calling for another Dostoevsky or Gogol, the Party seems nevertheless prepared to allow the presentation of a substantially less rosy picture. Soviet authors are now urged to show the "full complexities and contradictions of our heroic era," to "show social relations through conflicts in the plot." Charging that Soviet readers "no longer believe in gilded virtue," the Party now exhorts Soviet writers to produce "good satirical works," to expose "all shortcomings and difficulties in Soviet life." Finally, facing the problem directly, the Party asserts that when "the exaggeration of favorable aspects of reality is used as the writer's point of departure, actual reality is ignored, and the difficulties of our constructions are slurred over."

Again if the Party's reversal is genuine, it could mean that literature in the Soviet Union could again become a source of social protest and even express something of the universal tragedy of human life.

The concept of the positive hero was the third element of Stalinist socialist

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realism now under revision. The positive hero, always the leading character in Soviet works, is a paragon of Communist virtue. The central figure in all Soviet plots, he is drawn without a single human imperfection. The fact that he is obviously too good to be true is of little concern to the Party. He has been designed not to be believed, but to be imitated. In the Party's own words, he is the "artists' generalization of the best, typical traits of the new Soviet man." A Rumanian Communist magazine in 1954 has given perhaps the best description of the positive hero in socialist realism:

> . . . He has penetrating eyes, flashing with lightning, he is husky, robust, with Herculean chest and muscles, he radiates strength and optimism. He doesn't drink and may even give up smoking. . . .

As such, his purpose is not to bring readers insights about the complexities of human personality, but rather to inspire them to greater efforts in the building of Communism. Through his portrayal, the artist is expected to teach the Soviet people "lofty aspirations, courage and optimism, steadfastness in the struggle for Communism—everything that makes Soviet man strong and beautiful."

THOUGH still convinced that literature must instruct readers in the Bolshevik virtues, the Party is nonetheless apparently prepared to permit writers greater freedom of characterization. The Party now takes to task "those writers who affirm that to create typical characters conscious exaggeration is necessary."

According to the new line, "the categorical demand for exaggeration has caused Soviet literature much harm." Specifically, it has "created unreal, stilted heroes, mounted on pedestals." The Party even allows that "the Soviet reader legitimately protests against such unbelievable characters."

The presence of the positive hero as the dominant character-type in Soviet literature was intimately related to the Stalin cult; the same atmosphere which produced slavish adoration of Stalin in political life also encouraged similar treatment of the Stalin-like positive heroes in the literary sphere. Soviet authors were, in effect, paying symbolic homage to Stalin and to the society which he created. It seems reasonable to hope that under the new "collective leadership," the positive hero will be replaced by characters with more authenticity.

# Recent Soviet Verse

**by AVRAHM YARMOLINSKY**

VERSE was a popular medium in prerevolutionary Russia. It has remained so in the Soviet Union. Of the 738 delegates to the Second Congress of Soviet Writers, which took place in December, 1954, there were 241 who registered as poets, a number only a little lower than that of the men and women who described themselves as novelists, and nearly four times as large as that of the playwrights. Since the ratio of delegates to authors was 1 to 5, it may be assumed that there were then approximately 1,200 professional poets in the USSR. No statistics about the output of volumes of new verse are available, but it must be considerable.

Last year saw the publication of a new edition of Sergei Yesenin's poems in two volumes. The 150,000 copies printed were immediately bought up. There are no reviews devoted exclusively to poetry and comment on it, but the literary periodicals publish much more verse than do their opposite numbers in this country, and not a few poems find their way into the columns of the Moscow *Literary Gazette*. The better work usually appears in the substantial monthlies sponsored—and controlled—by the Union of Soviet Writers. *The New World, October,* and *The Banner* come out in Moscow, *The Star* and *Neva* in Leningrad. An examination of the verse in the recent issues of these five magazines will make it possible to give a fairly adequate idea of the themes that engage Soviet poets. It is difficult, of course, to convey the quality of their performance.

Much of the work is by newcomers. Established practitioners of the art—middle-aged or elderly—are definitely outnumbered. One looks in vain for new verse from the pen of that delicate lyricist, Anna Akhmatova, who ten years ago was expelled from the Union of Writers after her work had been denounced by Andrey Zhdanov as "suffused with the spirit of pessimism and decadence." Nor are there any contributions by Boris Pasternak, the most authentic poet to use the Russian tongue since the death in 1921 of Alexander Blok. Two years ago, after a long silence, Pasternak caused something of a sensation by publishing a group of ten poems, allegedly the concluding chapter of a new novel on which he had been at work for some time and which has not yet been offered to the public. The pieces mark no significant change in his manner, which is distinguished by a unique way of viewing the world, and a highly sophisticated, rather private language.

A Soviet reader, opening his magazine, is apt to light upon that a-political thing, a love lyric. "Kiss me!" is the refrain of a "romance," from the Ukrainian, in the current issue of the Leningrad *Star*. The lover may lack single-mindedness, though he also lacks complexity. "I have two loves," he says in one poem: "the Revolution and you." The situation of man and a woman who are together yet lonely is presented in one poem, and another offers the monologue of a woman who is in love with a married man. He is a father, and the exemplar of Communist ethics decides to give him up rather than rob his baby daughter of the word, "papa."

There are variations on such stock poetic themes as the seasons, especially spring with its showers and winter with its snows; journeys; the land in its various aspects; the human face; the irreversible flow of time. More rarely the poet reflects on his craft in an elementary

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AVRAHM YARMOLINSKY *was, until recently, Chief of the Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library; he is the author of* Dostoevsky—a Life *and the editor of* A Treasury of Russian Verse.

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fashion, and sometimes a didactic note is sounded. A versifier of long standing offers this advice:

Live with your whole heart,
life is a prize,
Watch over it, praise it.

Praising, eulogizing, is one of the chief occupations of the Soviet poet. He celebrates the joys of labor, industrial and agricultural. He finds an oil-gusher in Azerbaijan an inspiring sight. The collective farm figures in several pieces. The tractor continues to plough up the slopes of Parnassus, and the airplane has come within the poet's purview. International brotherhood, too, has its celebrants. The sight of a saleswoman in a Moscow department store smiling at a Chinese customer, or of a Russian girl in a domino dancing with a Vietnamese boy is a heart-warming "little holiday" to one poet. Friendship with Yugoslavia is urged by another. The March issue of *The Banner* contains a lament for the Hiroshima victims of the atomic bomb. The range of political themes includes reminiscential glimpses of the heroic years of the revolution, of the more recent Finnish armed conflict and of what is officially styled the Great Patriotic War, i.e., World War II.

The Soviet Fatherland is proudly extolled in several lyrics, but there are more poems testifying to the greater glory of the Party—this presumably on account of its Twentieth Congress held recently (Russians have a weakness for *vers d'occasion*). *Neva*, the monthly launched at the beginning of this year, contains a piece that is not quite run-of-the-mill, at least as far as its prose sense is concerned. A mother sits waiting for the return of her son from a session of the local Party committee; he is late, and she is deeply disturbed: will he be admitted to the Party, and so have a "second birth," or will he be refused admission?

Inseparable from the Party is one great name. The issue of the leading Moscow monthly for December, 1955, carried a reverent lyric about the town "where Stalin first saw the light." This piece stands alone. The quasi-religious cult of the Georgian has been replaced by the cult of Lenin. According to one poem,

As ever, burning yet not consumed,
Bright and hot as our blood,
Lenin's single Truth,
Eternal, our own, shines above us.

Another has it that Lenin is

. . . In all the living,
in their discussions,
plans,
souls—
alive and flaming,
as never before.

A third tells of a delegate from the women weavers of Shanghai who travels the thousands of miles to Moscow to lay a bouquet of flowers at "the leader's feet." The poem works up to this climax:

That the roses
Might bloom in the frost,
She presses them to her heart.

(Florists, please note!). Lines entitled "Lenin With Us" and translated from Abkhasian (a Caucasian tongue) end liturgically:

He was
he is
he always will be with us.

It may be observed in passing that much verse rendered from the languages of the national minorities of the Union finds its way into print.

The Soviet reader may also come upon a narrative poem running to great length. Thus *The Banner* has just serialized a novel in verse containing no less than 45 "chapters," by a poet who came into some prominence during the late war.

It is an account of the fortunes of four members of the Komsomol, including the author, against the background of two decades of Soviet history, seen in the light of Communist orthodoxy. The youths volunteer as laborers for the construction of the Moscow subway, and eventually two of them become great, dedicated engineers. Toward the end of the rather lively tale one of them plans to take part in the first Soviet interplanetary flight, while a son of another goes off to emulate his father by building power stations and new cities. The author's easy conversational manner, allowing for personal asides, reminds one dimly of Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* and its Byronic models.

RECENT Soviet verse is not without passages and whole compositions that attest to a poet's eye and ear, a poet's ability to reveal a personal experience in personal language. Such a piece is apt to be the work of a novice, cultivating what may be called the private sector of poetry, and doing it at the risk, recently a diminishing one, of displeasing the powers that be. Since the early thirties, when officialdom clamped down a uniform style on literature, the prevalent method in poetry has been that of explicit statement, resulting at best in a kind of imagism. Vladimir Mayakovsky's studied cacophony, his prosody, which parallels that of Gerard Manley Hopkins, his step-like arrangement of lines, are sedulously imitated, and the inexact rhyme introduced by Valery Brusov half a century ago is widely used. For the rest, conventional technique prevails. There is no irony, no play of ambiguity, and little humor. Avantgardism, experiments with form, are out of the question, in verse as in prose. The obvious absence of foreign influences confirms the impression of cultural isolation.

As heretofore, not seldom the verse descends to the level of slogan writing, of halleluja literature, of what

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in Soviet parlance is known as *lacquering* reality. It is, of course, a matter of common knowledge that in the Communist society the poets, like the other artists, are required to promote a ready-made ideology and a day-to-day official policy by radiating optimism and molding opinion and behavior. The Party mandate has recently been repeated in familiar terms. "Creative activity in the field of literature and art," said Khrushchev in his report to the Twentieth Congress, "must be permeated with the spirit of the struggle for Communism, it must brace the hearts, inspire firmness of conviction, develop social consciousness and comradely discipline." The fact is that by and large the versifier tries to accommodate himself to this demand. A liberalizing leaven is at work in the vast Soviet world. Poetry has been affected by it only to the extent that more apolitical verse is now being published.

# Music Since Stalin

**by NICOLAS SLONIMSKY**

OBSERVERS of Soviet music are apt to take a simplified view of the stylistic and aesthetic struggle among Soviet musicians: talented composers are oppressed by the untalented functionaries of Soviet music, with the result that it is reduced to the lowest common denominator of stereotyped production. After the death of Stalin (which coincided in time with the death of Prokofiev) in March, 1953, the same observers jumped to the conclusion that the new Prokofievs would now have a better chance to develop, unfettered by prohibitive decrees.

The situation in Soviet music is not quite as simple as that. There was no liberation after Stalin's death, and, truth to tell, there was no musical absolutism before that. When Prokofiev's Seventh Symphony — his last — was performed for the first time in America and in Europe, there was a general outcry that Prokofiev's indomitable spirit was crushed by the dark forces operating in the name of Stalin, that Prokofiev had finally submitted to the necessity of writing accessible music, and died artistically before his physical death. This was a very popular view to take at the time when absolute anti-Sovietism was almost as compulsory on this side of the Iron Curtain as absolute Stalinism was compulsory in the Soviet domain.

But public taste ruled otherwise, and the Seventh Symphony of Prokofiev became as popular outside Russia as in Leningrad and Moscow. The unctuous explanations of Soviet writers describing Prokofiev's Seventh Symphony as a paean to youth proved unnecessary; the music exhibited a youthful vitality, to be sure, but not because of Prokofiev's deliberate intention to make it so; virtually all Soviet composers want to write vigorous music, and if Prokofiev succeeds where they fail, it is simply a matter of relative talent.

A MUSIC historian unfamiliar with the peripeteia of musical affairs in Russia would not be able to tell, from the evidence of Prokofiev's music, whether he was oppressed or not. Prokofiev had genius, but he never joined the extreme modern school of composition; with the exception of his early works, he never indulged in polytonal writing; as to his melodies and rhythms, they were always symmetrical and solid. He was condemned as one of the Soviet obscurantists in 1948, but the musical public in Russia accepted Prokofiev wholeheartedly.

The position of Shostakovitch in Soviet music was more vulnerable than that of Prokofiev. Shostakovitch took a political and ideological line, from his earliest steps in music. His proclaimed intention was to write for the masses, and any deviation from this course was therefore regarded by his critics, and by Shostakovich himself in his periodic re-

NICHOLAS SLONIMSKY, *a Russian-American composer and musicologist, is perhaps best known for his book* Music Since 1900. *His newest book is* A Lexicon of Musical Invective.


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Prokofiev



Shostakovitch

Khatchaturian

cantations, as an ideological error. It is therefore remarkable that his style has not zigzagged more violently than it has.

But Shostakovitch is a much lesser talent than Prokofiev, and his failures reveal the deficiencies of his basic musical sense. Yet, even with Shostakovitch, it is difficult to tell, by the evidence of the music itself, whether his inability to express himself fully was due to political circumstance or whether he was inherently incapable of maintaining a uniformly high level of writing.

The third name among best known Soviet composers is that of Aram Khatchaturian. Like Shostakovitch, he was criticized for writing music for the élite rather than for the people. This criticism is even more difficult to understand than the attacks on Prokofiev and Shostakovitch, for Khatchaturian writes music of color and rhythm, excitingly oriental in its background, the kind of music that has a direct appeal, and is not burdened by *any* of the technical devices of modern music. In the accepted manner of the Stalin era, Khatchaturian confessed his musical sins, and promised to do better.

The Stalinist absolutism was, however, a very real and ominous phenomenon for Soviet composers who wanted to enlarge their resources and to learn something from the experience of Western musicians. The Union of Soviet Composers had in its leadership several little Stalins who could not write very good music, but who knew what good Soviet music was supposed to be, and who could dictate musical policy. Intellectual curiosity became a crime; composers under attack were compelled to testify again and again that they were never tempted by Western wiles of atonality and jazz; even Prokofiev had to apologize for his proximity to Western influences.

THE measure of post-Stalinist freedom will be gauged by the freedom of discussion of modern techniques, particularly the technique of twelve-tone composition. The name of Schoenberg is still invoked in the Soviet musical press as that of the arch-devil of bourgeois perversion, and tortuous dialectics are used to exorcise that particular *diabolus in musica.*

Still, some concessions to modern music have been made: Béla Bartok, for instance, has been declared a master of true people's music, and his polytonal transgressions have been forgiven. Even Stravinsky, who is usually described by Soviet music critics as a misanthropic reactionary and a sinister influence among Western musicians, has been cautiously accepted, at least in his early productions. Tikhon Khrennikov, Secretary General of the Union of Soviet Composers, declared in 1948 that *Petrouchka* was a mockery of Russian folklore, perpetrated by Stravinsky in order to impress the degenerate Parisians with the barbaric side of Russia. But in 1955 Shostakovitch gave a talk to the youth section of the Union of Soviet Composers, in which he dissented from this view. While insisting that young Russian composers should cultivate folk music, he said:

> There are instances when a composer makes use of a folk song, but his work does not necessarily become a people's music because of that. We find a number of such examples among Stravinsky's compositions. However I must exclude *Petrouchka.* This score cannot be regarded as anti-national, as it is described by some.

A Soviet painter whose lucrative specialty was to paint Stalin in an heroic pose with his right hand outstretched in the direction of the rising sun, has ruefully admitted that he had, by some compensatory impulse, painted a number of impressionistic nudes, and even allowed foreign correspondents to view same in his studio, presumably as proof of his de-Stalinization. It is not unlikely that after a thorough de-Stalinization of the Union of Soviet Composers, unknown and exciting scores will be produced by composers who had surreptitiously written unabashedly modern music, even—oh horrid thought!—12-tone arrangements of popular songs

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## THE THAW AS SEEN BY A SOVIET CITIZEN

**FROM his imprisonment for revolutionary activities in 1908 to his membership in the Supreme Soviet, ILYA EHRENBURG has used his pen to defend the Communist cause. Awarded the Stalin International Peace Prize, he is the author of numerous novels, the latest of which, *The Thaw* (1952), hinted guardedly at a change of climate in the USSR. To discover what one who is regarded as the Soviet regime's most favored journalist now has to say, the editors of *The New Republic* cabled Mr. Ehrenburg to send his views on life in Russia since Stalin's death three years ago.**

# Yesterday and Today

**by ILYA EHRENBURG**

THERE is much talk abroad about the present-day Soviet Union. Some assert that everything here has changed, while others claim that nothing has changed. It seems to me both are wrong. Much has changed and is changing, but that does not mean we repudiate our entire past. Of course, we recognize our mistakes. We are neither angels nor devils, and it is human to err. But every Soviet person realizes that if we had not built our society, we should now be unable to argue about how to improve various aspects of our life. A house is always built from the foundation not from the roof, and a construction site is never an orderly place. Only when the walls are up can you begin to think of how to place the rooms, where furniture will go and where to hang pictures.

Amateur theatricals are popular all over the world but there are not many amateurs who go in for physics. History, however, is something every amateur tackles. This notwithstanding the fact that history is a highly complicated science calling not only for rich archives but for time as well. If you go up close to a Gothic Cathedral, you will see only rust on the door or stains on the stones. To understand the intent of the architect you must step away a hundred paces. History also requires distance, not in space but in time. I personally am not at all inclined to attempt an evaluation of our recent past.

Like all my fellow citizens I am glad about what is happening in our country but not surprised. How can man be surprised at seeing fields turn green in the spring if he knows that he planted them in the autumn? Many fine things have been accomplished in the Soviet Union of late, but it would be naïve to call them miracles. Foreigners on a return visit notice many things that are new. Some say that we have more meat and milk products. Others note that the people are more frank and enthusiastic when they speak at meetings. Still others point out that more houses are going up and that their architecture is more simple and severe, more sensible, as it were, while still others are surprised at the large number of foreigners they see on the streets of Moscow. There are those who admire our art shows and those who admit that people have grown merrier and their conversation is less constrained. All that is true. Yet we cannot separate our present from our past.

I shall try to explain what I mean by examples from spheres familiar to me. Let us take painting. Here changes are indeed striking. A major event this spring was the big show of paintings by Saryan, one of our most important artists. His work has nothing in common with those vast canvases depicting historical events or set genre scenes that made up our art exhibitions five years ago and that distressed us with their likeness to photographs, their lack of artistic approach to art, their academicism.

Today you will find other shows as well in Moscow with excellent portraits, landscapes and still lifes. We did not have shows like that before. "Hence everything has changed," the foreign reader will say. I ask him to ponder on where those fine painters came from. They did not drop out of the sky nor did they learn to paint in a month or a year. That means they were working before, that they have always worked well. Why have they now been recognized? Because the standards of the people who visit the art shows, ordinary Soviet people, have risen; because the ordinary Soviet people have developed intellectually. That did not happen in a month or a year.

The foreign reader may wonder how people who have often been fed substitutes can appreciate real art. The foreign reader should realize that in 38 years Soviet society has developed to a remarkable degree. Our museums are visited by millions of common people. Andrei Rublyov and Rembrandt, Renoir and Serov have taught the workingman to understand painting. Good artists are appreciated not by the rich collectors and art connoisseurs but by the people at large.

THE same thing is true of literature. A few years back I declared that our public was much more complex and subtle than hundreds of characters found in novels which many of our authors offer this public. In the first 15 or 20 years of Soviet society our culture grew in breadth frequently at the expense of its depth. But the thirties saw the beginning of a deepening process. Today we see the results of this intellectual development of our people. We writers are delighted by the possibilities that have opened up before us; we are happy that we have lived to see this day, but we know what we owe to preceding decades.

What I have said of art may be applied to other spheres of our life. We

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have learned to distinguish the principles on which our society is based, principles which seem to us correct, from the mistaken applications of those principles. The people admit their mistakes when they are strong and confident that they can correct them. One can only pity those philosophers abroad who take our strength for weakness and their own wishes for reality. One might also remind them of a certain good old book which speaks of a man who beholds a mote in his brother's eye but does not consider the beam in his own eye.

The changes in our country are naturally connected with changes in the international situation. Sober-minded people everywhere are beginning to realize that the Cold War is coming to an end. Some explain it by saying that the Soviet foreign policy has changed. Others hold the relaxation became possible after certain moves made by certain statesmen in the West. It would be truer to say that the Cold War has come to disgust hundreds of millions of people in both camps.

We see how much cultural co-operation with foreign countries can give us. Our motion picture industry has benefited greatly from its acquaintance with new Italian cinematography. Our publishing houses will undoubtedly learn something from the French, who are now holding an exhibition of their books and art reproductions in Moscow. Our agronomists who visited America are now better able to appreciate the use of stimulators in plant growth.

It seems to me that the countries of the West could also learn something from us. Educators in the West would surely find Soviet books for children, so unlike corrupting comics, of interest. The Soviet ballet and Soviet puppet theater have left fruitful traces of their visits to countries in Western Europe. Perhaps the Americans would be interested in studying certain aspects of our educational work and finding out why Soviet workers prefer Tolstoy or Stendhal to detective stories.

Scientists want to pass on their experience to others and learn of the achievements of their foreign colleagues. Nations want to trade with each other. Everyone, no matter where he lives, is tempted by the opportunity to see other countries and continents and become acquainted with different ways of life. Everyone has dreamed of seeing the world, and today there is much talk here about foreign tourists who are coming and trips that Soviet people will make to Italy, France, England and America.

In this new and hopeful situation the development of relations with America is most difficult. It seems to me that now it is not we who are at fault. Some Americans feel that Soviet propaganda has made my countrymen hostile toward America. That is not so. Take two categories of people, far different from each other, writers and taxi drivers. Our writers admire American authors, men like Hemingway, Steinbeck, Caldwell, Saroyan, Fast and Arthur Miller. Millions of readers share their opinion. The popularity of *The Old Man and the Sea* is evidence of that. As for the taxi drivers, they like American cars and have a high opinion of the engineers and workers in Detroit. We feel no hostility toward America. On the contrary, there is much about the American character which Russians find to their liking. My countrymen, of course, do not like the belligerent speeches that some American politicians make. But I am not at all certain that sober-minded people in America itself like them very much. Perhaps certain changes have taken place in America, too. It may be that America's today also differs from its yesterday.

The author of *Ecclesiastes* said that to everything there is a season; that there is a time to gather stones together and a time to cast away stones. To my mind throwing stones does not pay. It is far better to place them one on top of the other to make monuments or houses. At the very height of the Cold War, in 1949, I wrote:

> There is nothing more disgusting than racial or national arrogance. World culture has blood vessels that cannot be severed with impunity. The nations have learned and will continue to learn from one another. I believe that one may respect national peculiarities, rejecting national isolation.

At that time we sometimes succumbed to the Cold War atmosphere and tended toward cultural isolation. Today much of that has changed. Today it is particularly sinful to throw stones. If the Soviet Union has been able to agree on many things with all kinds of countries with India, France, Yugoslavia an Sweden, why can't we and the Amer cans try to find a common language Really, we have lost our tempers an exposed each other to a sufficient degre It is time now to change our tone an our tune. Mankind demands this of u

*June, 1956* *Moscow*

# Life of a Correspondent

**by DANIEL L. SCHORR**

No doubt about it—for correspondents it was easier the old way. When a man was denounced in the press or from an official rostrum, it could be safely taken to mean sudden oblivion. One did not have to bother about checking Soviet sources because there weren't any. Now things are more confusing. Alexander Gerasimov, the high priest of the "cult of personality" in the arts and the sworn enemy of progressive trends in painting, should have been a quick victim of the new line. And it looked as though he might be when an official exhibition of Frenc impressionists was opened here an when Gerasimov had to confess, in the newspaper *Soviet Culture,* that maybe he had painted too many Stalin portraits. But Gerasimov is still president of the Academy of Art, still much in evidence and still willing to discourse at length, when I meet him at receptions, on why it's dangerous to let Russians look at Western modern art.

Similarly with Dr. Trofim Lysenko, Stalin's Number one geneticist, who used to be top banana in Soviet biology. He was removed recently from his job as president of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and, by all the laws of

DANIEL L. SCHORR *is Moscow news correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System.*

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rnalistic preconceptions about Rus- hould have been in serious trouble. ien he turned up at a meeting commemorating Luther Burbank and, when asked by an American reporter what he was doing, said cheerfully, "I have more work than I need." And it has been made clear that Lysenko's notions of genetics have not been completely repudiated, but will be forced to contend now with other ideas.

In the old days, when there was virtually no contact with Soviet officials, a correspondent could devote himself to the serene exegesis of the Soviet press. Now he rubs shoulders frequently at receptions with Khrushchev and Bulganin and lesser lights of the Soviet hierarchy (on a considerably freer basis than I ever could meet high American officials in three years as a correspondent in Washington) and can put questions to them directly, being obliged to go in for some first-hand reporting.

The other day Ivan Piriev, director f the Moscow Film Studios, told us iat projects for new pictures no longer ave to be submitted to the Ministry f Culture in advance. And he agreed iat Soviet movies should face romance iore frankly and even show lovers kiss- g.

Director Inozemtsev of the Cen- al Television Studio in Moscow, agrees ith "some" of the criticism in the press out dull programs, but says that a ply will be made to other attacks. The onthly organ of Marshal Zhukov's linistry of Defense says that Stalin left ie Soviet armed forces completely un- repared for the German invasion in 941, and *Red Star*, the Army's daily ewspaper, strikes back and says the my was not unprepared. Which au- horitative organ of the Defense Min- istry is authoritative? The element of finality, so convenient to the correspondent, has vanished and the state of flux, which the correspondent abhors, is the order of the day.

Even the censorship, which could once be counted upon to enforce uniformity, is no longer reliable. The censor cuts a passage from one dispatch, leaves a similar passage intact in the dispatch of another correspondent. A fact which is banned one day may be passed the next. One can even write a letter to the unseen censor protesting against a deletion and occasionally will win out. We can sympathize with the censor: he seems as confused by the New Look as we are.

Perhaps the most confusing development of all has been "de-Stalinization" (a term, incidentally, that was invented by rewrite men and editorial writers in the United States and gratefully received by correspondents in Moscow). At first the trend looked sharp and clear. Stalin was openly attacked in a series of speeches at the Party congress in February, culminating in the attack by Khrushchev in a secret speech. Word of the Khrushchev attack was leaked to foreign correspondents by a Western Communist journalist—we assumed by design. The Khrushchev speech was disseminated to Communists throughout the country by being read at meetings; later, cautious echoes of it began to appear in the press. A switch in line in Soviet Russia is usually total and complete. We waited for the utter effacement of Stalin, and we thought it was happening when portraits of the dictator began to disappear from the Tretyakov Gallery of Russian art, when musicians stopped using the title of "Holder of the Stalin Prize."

But now we have found that the anti-Stalin campaign has not developed as dramatically as we expected. It seems now the intention is to turn him not into an "un-fact," but just into an "unhero." There are still plenty of Stalin statues and portraits around. When a big picture of Stalin was removed from my floor at the Metropole Hotel, my breath quickened. But it was restored a few hours later—cleaned and dusted.

On a recent trip to Stalin's native state of Georgia, a month after the riots in connection with the anniversary of his death in March, we found that the new anti-Stalin line was being widely ignored, or at least cautiously applied, by local Communist officials. His birthplace of Gori was still one great monument to him, and as far as local inhabitants were concerned, he had never been downgraded.

In the Georgian capital of Tiflis, a statue of Lenin was unveiled in the main square (the first Lenin statue they got around to putting up), but in the parade that accompanied the ceremony there were more portraits of Stalin than of Lenin. That word "monolithic" that used to apply to everything in the Soviet Union is getting a slightly frayed appearance.

There is evidence of a somewhat more irreverent public attitude towards the top men on the Soviet hierarchy, revealed in jokes which are usually not new, but are told more openly. There is the story of a man sentenced to 23 years' imprisonment for calling a Cabinet minister lazy and incompetent (the name of the minister, which varies from one telling to another, is included in the story). It is explained that three years of the sentence are for slander, 20 years for divulging a state secret. There is the story of a woman raising one cornstalk in her flower garden and, when asked what variety of flower it is, replies, "Dream of Khrushchev"—a reference to Khrushchev's preoccupation with the vast experiment in corn-raising.

In this year when the wings of the MVD have been clipped, when workers have been told officially they can change jobs without going to jail for it, when convictions on the strength of unsupported confessions have been re-

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pudiated, when ideas begin to clash in the arena of public discussion, when Russians venture to talk to foreigners and sometimes even visit their hotels, the correspondent hungry for a big trend to spot, would like to write of the Great Thaw. But every trend has its qualification. Recently, when I was on a visit to a provincial town, a Russian called on me in my hotel room, explained that he was simply anxious to meet an American, talked to me freely by the hour. It seemed the most convincing evidence of the new freedom. But, I subsequently learned that within a half hour of my departure from the town, my new-found friend was arrested, held in jail overnight and interrogated about his contact with a foreigner. Perhaps Russia is moving towards greater freedom, but, as Khrushchev once said in another connection, Moscow was not built in a single night.

And so we go on reporting daily events and waiting for the pattern to reveal itself more clearly. Meanwhile, the changing times have their impact on our personal lives, but in a way not easy to discern. One meets a Russian, sees him several times, but then he mysteriously breaks off the acquaintanceship. Or one sees him in restaurants, but he avoids an invitation to his home. The great ice-jam seems broken in places, but one still collides with the drifting floes. One meets Russian officials at receptions, but their ministries are still guarded by troops and personal interviews in their offices are almost impossible to arrange.

One impact of the new times, however, is sharp and clear. More visas are being issued to foreigners, and one can speak of the first tourist season since the war. The vanguard is already with us, armed with letters of introduction from the folks at home. Our island has been invaded, our fortress penetrated. The problem is no longer coexistence with the Soviets, but coexistence with our compatriots. The most exclusive American colony in the world is beleaguered. Now, we, too, must give cocktail parties. We must give briefings on Russia and submit to briefings on the bourgeoning election campaign at home. Already, we begin to feel like an auxiliary of Intourist.

*June, 1956* *Moscow*


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